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Hyun Jin Kim 
 
THE INTER-KOREAN CONFLICT OVER THE NORTHERN 
LIMIT LINE: APPLYING THE THEORY OF HISTORICAL 
CONSOLIDATION 
 
Regardless of its uncertain legal status, it is the legal reality that the Northern Limit 
Line (“NLL”) has served as a de facto maritime demarcation line in the Yellow/West Sea in 
the absence of a peace treaty for the Korean Peninsula. Aside from its legal definition, 
however, the core of the NLL conflict is whether it has been historically consolidated as a 
valid legal system that may be enforceable against all States, and whether South Korea has 
historic title over the waters lying south of the NLL. In order to find an answer, it is 
important to determine whether there was either recognition or acquiescence on North 
Korea’s part during the formative period.  
 Judging from international legal practices and jurisprudence, has South Korea’s claim 
of historic title consolidated? The answer is yes for the following reasons. First, South Korea 
has continually exercised its sovereign authorities before and after North Korea’s first-ever 
protest in 1973, though the absence of relevant domestic legislation is still pointed out.  
Secondly, South Korea sufficiently manifested its sovereignty around the vicinity for 
two decades. Given the particular circumstances of the Peninsula, the two-decade period 
seems legally sufficient for the purpose of historical consolidation. Given the fact that North 
and South Korea had debated over the maritime delimitation in the course of the armistice 
negotiations, both must have been highly sensitive to this issue as belligerents and must have 
recognized its importance. Most significantly, as multiple historic instances indicate, North 
Korea had acted in recognition of the NLL after the establishment of the armistice system. 
Third, South Korea fulfilled the requirements of effective occupation for the period 
considering North Korea’s effective acquiescence. Therefore, North Korea’s late protest 
violates the principle of estoppel. North Korea should have launched a protest during the time 
 vii 
when South Korea formed its historic title through the public and notorious exercise of its 
governmental authorities. North Korea must have taken advantage of the stability provided 
by the NLL’s role as a de facto maritime demarcation line while rebuilding its naval force. 
For international stability, therefore, North Korea must be estopped from protesting at a later 
time as against South Korea’s reliance on North Korea’s silence.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As a legacy of colonial times, islands and waters remain as the most explosive source 
of conflicts in Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, China and Japan have been involved in 
military confrontations over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the South China Sea. Additionally, 
China and Southeast Asian nations have both claimed the Spratly and Paracel Islands. In the 
East Asian theater, moreover, Japan and Russia have argued over the Kuril Islands, while 
Japan has also engaged in a territorial dispute with South Korea over Dokdo/Takeshima 
Island. The inter-Korean Northern Limit Line (“NLL”) conflict is another maritime dispute 
occurring across the seas and oceans of Asia and is arguably the most dangerous powder keg 
to regional peace and security. 
In the Korean Peninsula, the NLL conflict has resulted in many tragedies: the First 
and Second Yeonpyeong Naval Clashes, which occurred in 1999 and 2002 respectively, killed 
many soldiers; the South Korean warship Cheonan was torpedoed near the NLL, resulting in 
the death of 46 sailors; the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island also killed four people, 
including 2 civilians. Furthermore, the conflict has led to a number of boat seizures. Even 
today, North Korea occasionally provokes a military crisis, while the U.S. and South Korean 
navies continue military exercises in response to these military provocations. Recently, Seoul 
strengthened the rules of engagement and also announced a plan to station more marines on 
the five South Korean-held northwest islands (“NWI”) off the shore of North Korea.1 The 
NLL, which runs near the coastline of North Korea for about 100 miles, is at the heart of the 
inter-Korean maritime conflict. 
                                                        
1 Tim Lister, Islands, Crabs and Skirmishes: The Koreas’ Maritime Mishaps, CNN WORLD, Nov. 26, 2010, 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/25/koreas.maritime.explainer/index.html?iref=allsearch. 
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After the Korean Armistice Agreement (“KAA”) was signed, the US-led United 
Nations Command (“UNC”) unilaterally drew the NLL, 3 nautical miles (“nm”) away from 
North Korea’s coastline. The line was initially set as a line of military control since both 
parties did not reach an agreement on the establishment of a maritime demarcation line in the 
course of armistice negotiations. However, the Demilitarized Zone (“DMZ”) was established 
on land. While its original purpose was to be a temporary line of military control, the NLL 
has not yet been replaced due to the absence of a peace treaty between the two Koreas.  
Because of the uncertain legal status of the NLL, Pyongyang has taken advantage of 
the conflict as politico-military leverage. Also Pyongyang has proposed multiple alternative 
lines and has condemned the NLL as “an illegal and brigandish line drawn by the U.S. on our 
sacred territorial water.”2 Interestingly, however, Pyongyang never challenged the NLL and 
the waters south of the line until the 1970’s. North Korea’s silence from 1953 to 1973 is a 
critical component of both the assessment of its attitude and the analysis of South Korea’s 
historic title in terms of international law relating to territory acquisition. 
Regardless of its uncertain legal status, it is the legal reality that the NLL has served 
as a de facto maritime demarcation line in the Yellow/West Sea under the armistice system of 
the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the main issues of the NLL conflict can be narrowed down 
to the following. First, does South Korean have a historic title to the NLL under the armistice 
system? Second, is South Korea’s historic title to the waters lying south of the NLL 
consolidated? Indeed the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Korea (“ROK MND”) and 
South Korean academics have relied heavily on the theory of historical consolidation in 
defense of the legal status of the NLL and the disputed waters. Both assert that the NLL has 
been historically consolidated as a de facto military demarcation line and, therefore, South 
                                                        
2 Id.  
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Korea has acquired sovereign rights over it.3  On the contrary, Pyongyang claims that the 
assertion is an inappropriate application of the theory to the dispute,4 thereby aggravating the 
inter-Korean conflict.5   
This conflict of opinion between the two Koreas arises from the fact that there was an 
insufficient examination of international law relating to territorial acquisition. First, neither 
the doctrinal basis of the theory of historical consolidation nor the constitutive elements of 
historic title have been thoroughly overhauled. Secondly, and most importantly, international 
legal practices and jurisprudence have not been explored to verify South Korea’s alleged 
historic title. Given the NLL’s significant role as part of the armistice system of the Korean 
Peninsula, South Korea must verify the legal basis of the NLL in international law in order to 
prevent North Korea from abusing it as politico-military leverage. In an effort to supplement 
the flawed South Korean approach, this thesis will therefore investigate international legal 
practices, opinio juris, academic writings, and jurisprudence of international courts and 
arbitrators to unravel the complicated legal issues.6 In this thesis, the concepts of historic title 
and of effective occupation will be thoroughly discussed to comprehensively understand the 
theory of historical consolidation and its requirements. 7  This well-grounded doctrinal 
                                                        
3  See Seong Ho Jeh, Buk-Bang-Han-Gye-Seon-Eui Beop-Jeok Yu-Hyo-Seong-Gwa Da-Eung Bang-Hyang 
[Legal Validity of the Korean Northern Limit Line and South Korea’s Possible Measures], 
CHUNGANGBEOPHAK Je7Jip Je2Ho [CHUNG-ANG L. REV. Vol. 7-2] 107, 116 (2005) (arguing that South 
Korea has a sovereign or at least an exclusive right over it by exercising decades-long effective control).  
4 Yong Joong Lee, Seo-Hae-Buk-Bang-Han-Gye-Seon-E Dae-Han Nam-Buk-Han Joo-Jang-Eui Guk-Je-Beop-
Jeok Bi-Gyo Bun-Seok [A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas], 
KYUNGBUKDAEHAKGYOBEOPHAKYEONGUWONBEOPHAKNONGO Je32Jip [KYUNGPOOK NAT’L. UNIV. L. REV. 
Vol. 32] 537, 554-55 (2010) (citing RODONG DAILY, July 11, 1999).  
5 See, e.g., John Pomfret & Blaine Harden, South Korean to Officially Blame North Korea for March Torpedo 
Attack on Warship, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 9, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/18/AR2010051803094.html; see also Martin Fackler, A Pattern of Aggression, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/asia/24north.html?_r=0. 
6 Indeed the South Korean academics have not paid much attention to trace the doctrinal basis of theory of 
historical consolidation, although they have used the theory to support their argument. Tai Uk Chung, Seo-Hae 
Buk-Bang-Han-Gye-Seon Jae-Ron: Yeonpyeongdo Po-Gyuk-Sa-Geon-Eul Gye-Giro [The Northern Limit Line 
and the North Korean Artillery Attack], MINJOOBEOPHAKNONCHONG Je45Ho [DEMOCRATIC LEGAL STUD. No. 
45] 255, 268–71 (2011).  
7 See, e.g., Florian Dupuy & Pierre-Marian Dupuy, The South China Sea: The Legal Analysis of China’s 
Historic Rights Claim in the South China, 107 AM. J. INT’L. L. 124 (2013); see also Tadashi Ikeda, Getting 
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analysis of the theory coupled with its appropriate application to actual disputes will shed 
new light on how to evaluate thorny territorial claims.  
This thesis is composed of six sections, including an introduction and a conclusion. 
Section II will generally introduce the inter-Korean conflict over the NLL, including the 
definition of the NLL, an overview of the conflict, and the importance of the NLL for the two 
Koreas. This section will also introduce the positions of Seoul and Pyongyang in relation to 
the legal status of the NLL. Furthermore, this section will discuss the two concepts of a 
maritime border versus a maritime demarcation line so as to identify the role of the NLL in 
the armistice system. Section III will focus on clarifying the doctrinal basis of the theory of 
historical consolidation. Most importantly, this section will analyze the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case (“Fisheries Case”). The Fisheries Case is a monumental case, which 
systemizes the theory of historical consolidation as a solution to the conventional difficulties 
and the ambiguities of the traditional modes of territorial acquisition. This section will also 
conduct a comparative analysis between the concept of historical consolidation and other 
traditional methods, such as acquisitive prescription and occupation, in order to verify the 
systematic interdependence and differences between them. Section IV will concentrate on the 
elements that are required to construct a historic title in a given territorial dispute. Due to the 
close connection between the constitutive elements and the concept of effective occupation, 
this section will also contain an analysis of the connection. Based on discussions in the 
previous sections, Section V will demonstrate whether South Korea’s alleged historic title to 
the NLL, as a legal institution of the armistice system, and the disputed waters has been 
consolidated under the armistice system of the Korean Peninsula. First, this section will thus 
elaborate on why and how historical consolidation is appropriate and applicable to the NLL 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Senkaku History Right, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 26, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/getting-senkaku-
history-right/. 
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conflict. Secondly, this section will articulate whether South Korea fulfilled the conditions 
required to consolidate its alleged title to the NLL and the disputed waters. 
 
I. THE INTER-KOREAN CONFLICT OVER THE 
NORTHERN LIMIT LINE 
 
A. Overview of the NLL Conflict 
 
1. Definition of the NLL 
 
The NLL refers to the disputed de facto maritime demarcation line between the two 
Koreas in the Yellow/West Sea.8 It is widely known that General Mark Clark of the UNC 
unilaterally proclaimed the NLL between the NWI and North Korea’s coastline after the 
enforcement of the KAA. 9  The NLL, which consists of multiple straight-line segments, 
extends into the Yellow/West Sea from the Military Demarcation Line (“MDL”) on land, and 
runs between the mainland portion of North Korea and the adjacent offshore islands, called 
the NWI, which have remained under South Korean control since the end of the Korean War. 
On its western end, the NLL extends out to the median line between China and the Korean 
Peninsula.10  
                                                        
8 Terence Roehrig, The Northern Limit Line: The Disputed Maritime Boundary between North and South Korea, 
NCNK ISSUE BRIEF, Sept. 2011, at 1. 
9 The Korean Armistice Agreement stipulates that “[t]he five western islands –Paengyong-do, Taechong-do, 
Sochang-do, Yonpyong-do and U-do– shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
UNC.” Korean War Armistice Agreement art. 2.13(b), U.N.C.-N. Kor.-China, July 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 234 
[hereinafter KAA]. 
10 This is why the NLL conflict may be referred to international dispute resolution organs. Some segments of the 
NLL deeply intrude into international waters, such as the high sea and the potential EEZ of China.  
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Figure 1: Northern Limit Line and the Yellow/West Sea Area 
Source: Jon Van Dyke, The Maritime Boundary Dispute between North & South Korea in the Yellow (West) 
Sea, 38 North (July 29, 2010), http://38north.org/2010/07/the-maritime-boundary-between-north-south-korea-
in-the-yellow-west-sea/. 
 
Although many complexities surround the demarcation of the NLL, the conflict can 
be boiled down to a specific disagreement. When the KAA was signed in 1953, a maritime 
demarcation line was never delimited. Nevertheless, South Korea has exercised governmental 
authority over the disputed water lying south of the NLL for decades. In other words, the 
NLL is not a de jure maritime demarcation line between the two Koreas, though it has served 
as a de facto maritime demarcation line and has created a maritime buffer zone between them. 
 
2. Brief Background of the Conflict 
 
Through armistice negotiations, both North and South Korea agreed to draw the MDL 
with the 2 kilometers-width DMZ on either side of the line, failing to reach an agreement 
regarding a maritime demarcation line due to strong differences of opinion.11 Interestingly, 
Pyongyang insisted on a 12 nm (22 kilometers) standard for delimiting its territorial water 
                                                        
11 Roehrig, supra note 8, at 1; see also KAA, supra note 9, at art. 2.15. 
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boundary contrary to the UNC’s position asserting a 3 nm standard (5.6 kilometers).12 At the 
time of the talks, however, a 3 nm standard was an accepted norm internationally.13 Ironically, 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) later adopted a 12 nm as 
the international standard. In any case, the two sides only came to a decision to mandate that 
“opposing naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the DMZ and to the land area of 
Korea under the military control of the opposing side” according to Article 2, Section 15 of 
the KAA.14 Obviously, this is a failure of the armistice talks, an indispensable element to 
prevent potential armed hostilities. 
 Although some cast doubt on the NLL’s date of creation, it is broadly admitted that 
General Mark Clark, the then-UNC commander, drew the NLL as a military control line in an 
effort to prevent the South Korean navy from advancing north after the armistice was 
signed.15 Significantly, however, Pyongyang never raised any official protest in the following 
two decades, since it might have been concerned about the overwhelming naval forces that 
the UNC/South Korea had. 16  It is often presumed that Pyongyang was aware of the 
                                                        
12 Roehrig, supra note 8, at 1. 
13 Id. 
14 A maritime demarcation line could have been delineated, thereby ignoring the prevailing authority of the 
UNC forces in both air and sea,” given the KAA Article 2, Section 15. In any case, as a result of the KAA, the 
UNC naval forces had to retreat from all islands and waters “covering from the Estuary of Yallu River in the 
west: Latitude 4151’N, and that of Tuman River in the east: Latitude 3935’N, all the way down to the 38th 
parallel.” Young Koo Kim, A Maritime Demarcation Dispute on the Yellow Sea, 2 J. E. ASIA & INT’L. L. 481, 
491–92 (2009). 
15 Roehrig, supra note 8, at 2 (quoting HEE KWON PARK, THE LAW OF THE SEA AND NORTHEAST ASIA 108 
(2000)). Until recently, it was generally known that the NLL was drawn on August 30, 1953. However, the 1974 
CIA report, declassified in 2002, has caused controversy with respect to the origin of the NLL, stating that “no 
documentation can be found to indicate that the NLL was established prior to 1960.” CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, THE WEST COAST KOREAN ISLANDS (1974), available at 
http://weekly.changbi.com/attachment/1010299189.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). However, the reliability of 
the document is also controversial. As will be discussed, there are still many instances proving the existence of 
the NLL prior to 1960’s, though the name may have been different at the beginning. GUK-BANG-BU [THE 
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA], BUK-BANG-HAN-GYE-SEON-EUL DAI-HA-NEUN WOO-RI-EUI 
JA-SE [THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA POSITION REGARDING THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE] (2nd ed. 2007) 2, available at 
http://www.military.co.kr/english/NLL/NLL.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). Once referred to international 
courts or arbitrators, the fact related to the date of creation may be determined on the basis of evidence produced 
by the parties. 
16  Jae Min Lee, Buk-Bang-Han-Gye-Seon-Gwa Gwan-Ryeon-Doen Gook-Je-Beop-Jeok-Moon-Je-Eui Jae-
Geom-To [Revisiting Legal Issues over the Northern Limit Line], SEOULGOOKJEBEOPYEONGOO Je15Kwon 
Je1Ho [SEOUL INT’L. L. REV. Vol. 15-1] 41, 43 (2008). 
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establishment of the NLL, possibly known as the Northern Patrol Line at the time.17 For 
Pyongyang, the presence of the NLL must have been a benefit because it efficiently 
prevented UNC/South Korea vessels from marching north. On that basis, Seoul has argued 
that Pyongyang also followed the NLL as a de facto maritime demarcation line between the 
NWI and North Korea’s adjacent coastal area.18  
Pyongyang officially began to express its dissatisfaction with the NLL in 1973 along 
with a series of naval confrontations.19 This so-called West Sea Incident was the beginning of 
Pyongyang’s continuing efforts to invalidate the NLL. The first protest against the NLL was 
recorded at a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (“MAC”) held on December 1st 
1973.20 At this meeting, Pyongyang’s representative called on all UNC/South Korean vessels 
to acquire prior notification and permission before navigating toward the NWI. 21 In the 
following years, Pyongyang declared its own EEZ as well as the 50 nm 1977 Military 
Warning Zone (“MWZ”) allegedly on the basis of the principle of equidistance under the 
UNCLOS. In addition, Pyongyang unilaterally proclaimed the Chosun Military Demarcation 
Line (“CMDL”) extending out from the end of the provincial boundary line between 
Hwanghae-do Province and Gyeonggi-do Province. Since then, Pyongyang continued to 
challenge the legal status of the NLL and suggested alternatives. Since the first post-war 
naval skirmish, the two Koreas have also entered into diplomatic disputes over the legality 
and validity of the NLL.  
On June 15, 1999, both sides were engaged in a naval skirmish that resulted in the 
sinking of two North Korean crafts. Pyongyang, in the name of the Korean People’s Army 
General Staff, issued a special communiqué publicly declaring the invalidity of the NLL, and 
                                                        
17 Roehrig, supra note 8, at 2. 
18 Jon M. Van Dyke, The Republic of Korea’s Maritime Boundaries, 18-4 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 509, 
530-31 (2003). 
19 See NARUSHIGE MICHISHITA, NORTH KOREA’S MILITARY-DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN: 1966-2008 52–72 (2009). 
20 Roehrig, supra note 8, at 2. 
21 Id. 
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proposing an alternative maritime demarcation line.22 Again, Pyongyang requested UNC and 
South Korean vessels to acquire a prior permission to transit to and from the NWI and to use 
a 2 nm-wide sea corridor for the transit.23 Of course Pyongyang’s alternatives were rejected 
by the UNC and Seoul.  
In the aftermath of Pyongyang’s first opposition in 1970’s, the NLL became an 
explosive flashpoint between the two Koreas. In 2002, North and South Korean navies 
clashed along the NLL. The exchange of fire continued until North Korean warships 
withdrew across the NLL. The South Korean navy announced that 5 were killed and 19 were 
wounded, and it is also estimated that 30 soldiers died and an unknown number wounded in 
North Korea.24 In 2010, the NLL drew wide attention from the international community due 
to the two events. The first event was the sinking of the South Korean warship, the Cheonan, 
which resulted in the death of 46 South Korean sailors. The second was the bombardment of 
Yeonpyeong Island, which also killed four South Koreans, including two civilians. Even 
today, the two Koreas have escalated military confrontations by continuously conducting 
military exercises in the vicinity of the NLL. 
 
3. Importance of the NLL: Issue-based Approach 
 
 Beneath the surface, the NLL is important to Pyongyang for economic reasons. First, 
the waters along the NLL provide one of the world’s richest fishing grounds, particularly blue 
                                                        
22 Id.  
23 Young Koo Kim, Buk-Han-Eee Joo-Jang-Ha-Neun Seo-Hae-Hae-Sang-Gyeong-Gye-Seon-Gwa Tong-Hang-
Jil-Seo-E Dae-Han Bun-Seok [Analysis on the North Korean-backed Maritime Demarcation Line and 
Navigation Order] SEOULGOOKJEBEOPYEONGOO Je7Kwon Je1Ho [SEOUL INT’L. L. REV. Vol. 7-1] 1, 9 (2000). 
Regarding the navigation routes unilaterally designated by Pyongyang, please refer to the map included in the 
following website, Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., The Cheonan Incident and North Korea’s Northern Limit Line 
Strategy, CENTER FOR DEFENSE STUDIES (May 25, 2010, 4: 28 PM), http://www.defensestudies.org/cds/the-
cheonan-incident-and-north-koreas-northern-limit-line-strategy/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).  
24  Aiden Foster-Carter, No-Penalty Shootout, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, July 3, 2002, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/DG03Dg01.html. 
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crab fishing.25 As the expected profits are enormous, Chinese trawlers even travel to these 
waters to fish.26 Due to the politico-military complexity surrounding the NLL, managing the 
Chinese fishing boats causes extreme difficulties for the South Korean maritime police.27  
Secondly, the NLL prevents Pyongyang from developing maritime trade and 
commerce along the coastline.28 As of now, North Korean merchant ships departing from the 
coastline must take a longer route around the NLL in order to avoid crossing it, rather than 
directly entering into external waters. As a result, their trips require extra miles and increased 
fuel costs. In the aftermath of the sinking of the Cheonan, both governments have entirely cut 
off most maritime trading between North and South Korean ports in the Yellow/West Sea. 
In the NLL conflict, national security is the most significant issue to both Koreas.29 
Because of its geo-political importance, the NLL conflict can be explosive unless dealt with 
adequately and carefully. Throughout the conflict, the NWI, located off the adjacent coastline 
of North Korea alongside the NLL and slightly north of the median line claimed by 
Pyongyang, particularly gave rise to a series of military confrontations, though Pyongyang 
does not challenge the status of the NWI itself. Since the closest point between the coastline 
and the islands are 7 nm apart, not only the NLL but also the NWI remain as a significant 
security threat to North Korea since it allows South Korean warships to closely approach the 
military installations stationed along its shoreline.30 This is why Pyongyang keeps suggesting 
that alternative lines be slightly adjusted southward. By shifting the NLL further south, 
Pyongyang can obtain “a larger maritime buffer from South Korean naval operations and 
intelligence activities.”31                                                         
25 Roehrig, supra note 8, at 3. 
26 See Suk Kyoon Kim, Illegal Chinese Fishing in the Yellow Sea: A Korean Officer’s Perspective, 5 J. E. ASIA 
& INT’L L. 455 (2012); see also Andrew Salmon, Why border hot-spot is Korean War Relic, BBC NEWS, Nov. 
25, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11839284. 
27 Roehrig, supra note 8, at 3. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 3. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
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The question then becomes, what makes the NLL so important to Seoul? First of all, 
the NLL, regardless of the absence of a maritime demarcation line, is still consistent with the 
KAA’s aim of preventing armed conflicts. The NLL has contributed to the maintenance of 
the armistice system, even in the absence of any provision creating a maritime buffer zone. In 
fact, both naval forces have conducted regular patrols and military operations in accordance 
with the existence of the NLL. As a matter of fact, issues over the NLL have been discussed 
at the MAC, which operates under the KAA.  
Secondly, the NLL plays a crucial role in the maritime security of South Korea. The 
NLL has effectively protected Seoul and its vicinity by allowing South Korea to monitor the 
movements of North Korean armed forces that have to take the long route round the NLL.32 
The NLL defends not only the NWI but also the Han River Estuary, considering that 
Pyongyang has installed a number of military stations along the Ongjin Peninsula.33 If the 
NLL had been shifted slightly southward, it would have allowed North Korean patrol boats to 
come closer to the Estuary that acts as a bulwark of Seoul.34 To that extent, the NLL reduces 
the possibility of a full-scale war between the two Koreas. If it were not for the NLL, the 
Incheon and Gimpo regions, and the Ganghwa Island, which are the outposts of the capital 
city area could have been jeopardized, since North Korean forces have continually prepared 
military landing operations that march from the Haeju or Ongjin Peninsula.35 From a military 
perspective, therefore, the absence of the NLL would make defense more difficult for South 
Korean forces, whereas it would make infiltration operation much easier for North Korean 
armed forces.36 Albeit Pyongyang appears to respect the territorial water boundary of the 
NWI, it is still hard to imagine that Seoul will accommodate Pyongyang’s demands to adjust                                                         
32 Jeh, supra note 3, at 112. 
33 Roehrig, supra note 8, at 3. 
34 Id. 
35 Dong Jin Chun, Buk-Bang-Han-Gye-Seon Non-Eui-Eui Jeon-Gae-Wa Hyang-Hoo Dae-Eung [Issues over the 
Northern Limit Line and Our Responses], TONGILJEONRYAK Je8Kwon Je3Ho [UNIFICATION STRATEGY Vol. 8-
3] 47, 64-5 (2008); Chung, supra note 6, at 168.  
36 Roehrig, supra note 8, at 3. 
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the current NLL, given the outstanding security concerns mentioned above.37   
 
 
 
Figure 2: North Korean Bases and Locations of Artillery 
Source: Claire Lee, Island Panicked by Surprise Attack, THE KOREA HERALD, Nov. 23, 2010, 
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20101123001291. 
 
B. Debates over the Legal Status of the NLL 
 
1. Seoul’s Stance 
 
 Throughout the NLL conflict, the ROK MND, and South Korean legal scholars have 
invoked multiple academic sources, customary international law, the UNCLOS, and the KAA 
in justification of the legal status of the NLL. However, the legal doctrines and theories 
invoked, such as acquisitive prescription and the theory of historical consolidation, have 
caused heated debates between the two Koreas because of the lack of comprehensive 
attempts to overhaul their doctrinal basis in international law. 
 
a. The Position of the ROK MND  
                                                         
37 Id. 
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Although it sometimes rhetorically describes the NLL as South Korea’s maritime 
frontier, the ROK MND, which is the most rigorous South Korean authority in the NLL 
conflict, firmly believes that the NLL must be protected as a de facto demarcation line in the 
Yellow/West Sea, particularly under the current armistice system.38 In this view, the ROK 
MND also highlights the fact that the NLL has effectively separated two military forces since 
the end of the Korean War.39  
In addition to this pragmatic view, the ROK MND also promotes an understanding of 
the backdrop of the KAA. According to the ROK MND, the KAA parties obviously 
recognized that islands and coastal areas within the 38th parallel and the northwestern part of 
the provincial boundary between Hwanghae-do Province and Gyeonggi-do Province were 
under the control of the UNC/South Korea.40 The UNC/South Korea agreed to withdraw 
from some islands lying south of the 38th parallel to the west coastline of North Korea to 
avoid blockade of the Haeju and Ongjin Peninsula in accordance with KAA article 2.13(b) 
and 2.15.41 In other words, the waters between the 38th parallel and the northwestern part of 
the provincial boundary could have been appertained to South Korea if the UNC/South Korea 
had not relinquished the waters.42 Therefore, the ROK MND strongly asserts that the NLL, 
though unilaterally established, must be respected as a de facto maritime demarcation line 
                                                        
38 See GUK-BANG-BU, supra note 16, at 2–11. 
39 Id. at 9. 
40 Id. at 4–8. 
41 Id; see also KAA, supra note 9, at art. 2.13(b) (stating that “Within ten days after this Armistice Agreement 
becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal 
islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time 
limit, unless there is a mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take 
any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term “coastal islands” refers 
to those islands which, although occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes 
effective, were controlled by the other side on June 24, 1950. However, provided that all the islands lying to the 
north and west of the provincial boundary line between Whanghaedo province and Kyonggido province shall be 
under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the 
Chinese People’s Volunteers, except the group of islands including Paengyong-do (37 ° 58’N, 124 ° 40’E), 
Taechong-do (37 ° 50’N, 124 ° 42’E), Sochung-do (37 ° 46’N, 124 ° 46’E), Yonpyong-do (37 ° 38’N, 125 ° 
40’E), and U-do (37 ° 36’N, 125 ° 58’E), which shall remain under the military control of the United Nations 
Commander-in-Chief."). 
42 Id. 
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because the NLL does not block the entire coastline of North Korea that had been surrounded 
by the UNC naval forces.43 According to the ROK MND, both parties must comply with the 
NLL unless otherwise provided in the KAA or any form of agreement.44  
 
 
Figure 3: North Korea’s Obligation to Retreat by the Primary Text of the KAA Article 2(13)(b). 
Source: THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, PROCEEDING MINUTE OF 
SOUTH AND NORTH MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE 5TH SESSION 280(1992). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
43 Id. at 4–9. 
44 Id. 
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Figure 4: North Korea’s Modified Obligation to Withdraw 
Source:  Young Koo Kim, A Maritime Demarcation Dispute on the Yellow Sea, 2 J. E. ASIA & INT’L. L. 481, 
487 (2009). 
 
 Furthermore, the ROK MND adduces to inter-Korean agreements to prove the legal 
status of the NLL. It insists that the NLL should keep serving as a de facto maritime 
demarcation line until an inter-Korean peace treaty resolves the current complexity. 45 
According to the ROK MND, the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges 
and Cooperation between the South and the North (“South-North Basic Agreement”) Article 
11 and the Protocol on Non-aggression Article 10 re-affirms the status of the NLL as a de 
facto maritime demarcation line.46 Due to the ROK MND’s belief in the effectiveness of the                                                         
45 Id. at 9. 
46 Id. at 7. Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and 
the North art. 11, S. Kor.-N. Kor., Dec. 13, 1991 [hereinafter Basic Agreement] (stating that “the South-North 
demarcation line and the areas for non-aggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line 
provided in the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, and the areas over which each side has 
exercised jurisdiction until the present time.”); Protocol on Non-aggression art. 10, S. Kor.-N. Kor., Sept. 17, 
1992 (providing that “the South-North sea non-aggression demarcation line shall continue to be discussed in the 
future. Until the sea non-aggression demarcation has been settled, the sea non-aggression zones shall be 
identical with those that have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the present time.”). However, it is 
generally admitted that this inter-Korean agreement is no longer effective. Even the South Korean courts ruled 
that the Basic Agreement has no binding authority as an international treaty. See, e.g., Constitutional Court 
[Const. Ct.], 92Hun-Ba6 (consol.), Jan. 16, 1997, (1997 KCCR, 9-1) (S. Kor.). Professor Yong Joong Lee also 
casts doubt on this approach, arguing that two different concepts “line” and “area” should be distinguished in 
relation to the interpretation of the Basic Agreement and the Protocol on Non-aggression. In other words, 
neither line nor area was ever agreed on since the end of the Korean War, except the provincial boundary line 
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South-North Basic Agreement, a ROK MND representative responded that the issue should 
be discussed at a ministerial-level talk on the premise that both sides comply with the NLL 
and the inter-Korean agreement.47  
 In support of its position, the ROK MND also presents a series of historical instances 
that might indicate Pyongyang’s recognition of or acquiescence to the existence of the NLL. 
First, the NLL was shown as a maritime demarcation line in the 1959 Chosun Central 
Yearbook, published by Pyongyang’s central news agency. 48  Second, a Pyongyang 
representative at the 168th MAC held in May 1963 officially affirmed the legal status of the 
NLL. In fact, the meeting was held to debate whether a Pyongyang spy ship had crossed the 
NLL. The UNC’s representative strongly denounced the alleged trespass.49 According to the 
record, the UNC/South Korea condemned it, saying that “we launched fire against that spy 
ship because it was trespassing.”50 In response, the Pyongyang representative refuted this 
claim, arguing that “the ship did not cross the NLL but stayed above the NLL.” 51 This 
response might indicate Pyongyang’s implicit recognition of the NLL as a de facto maritime 
demarcation line in the Yellow/West Sea. Third, the Red Cross of North Korea delivered 
flood relief supplies to its South Korean counterpart on September 29 and October 5 in 1984. 
The convoy fleets composed of battleships and patrol boats of North and South Korean 
navies met at the NLL to exchange the relief goods. Strictly speaking, a military craft is not 
entitled to conduct any operation outside the territorial boundary unless otherwise granted by 
particular permission. Therefore, the ROK MND also interprets this instance as an indication 
                                                                                                                                                                            
and the Han River Estuary. Lee, supra note 16, at 57–60. Compared to the ROK MND, the professor interprets 
“the areas that each party have exercised its jurisdiction until the present time” differently: “the areas that have 
been governed by the both parties until the present time,” id.  
47 GUK-BANG-BU, supra note 16, at 8. This response was made when Pyongyang’s representative vehemently 
lashed out about the NLL at the 3rd South-North general-level talk held in 2006. 
48 Id. at 16 (quoting CHO-SUN-CHOONG-ANG-NYEON-GAM [CHOSUN CENTRAL YEARBOOK] (Cho-Sun-Choong-
Ang-Tong-Shin-Sa [Chosun Central News Agency] eds. 1959)). 
49 MILITARY MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION OF THE JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF, MANUAL FOR THE KOREAN MILITARY 
ARMISTICE COMMISSION VOL. 4, at 138–40 (1999). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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of Pyongyang’s implicit recognition of the NLL.52 Last but not least, in May 1993, the Air 
Navigation Plan (“ANP”), which was promulgated by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (“ICAO”), slightly adjusted the Flight Information Region (“FIR”), and this 
adjustment reflected the NLL. Nevertheless, Pyongyang did not protest against the 
adjustment until the ANP came into effect in January 1998. Therefore, the FIR is still valid. 
Of course, the ICAO is not a binding authority that can participate in the international 
boundary delimitation through the formation of the FIR. However, the ICAO reflects the 
range and scope of each state’s territorial sovereignty because the FIR is closely connected 
with an individual State’s duty to rescue, such as the duty to rescue distressed airplanes 
within the boundary of the ANP.53 To sum up, on the basis of the instances mentioned above, 
the ROK MND believes that Pyongyang has acquiesced to the NLL’s role as a de facto 
maritime demarcation line.54 
 
b. Judicial Views on Inter-Korean Relations 
 
Even though South Korean courts never directly adjudicated territorial issues over the 
NLL, it is appropriate to go over their opinions on the territorial boundary of South Korea. 
The judicial opinions tend to stimulate the conservative sentiment among the South Korean 
public that the NLL must be protected as the maritime frontier of South Korea. In particular, 
the interpretation of Article 3 and 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea (“ROK 
Constitution”) can be said as a source of conflict of opinion. Article 3 stipulates that “the 
territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent 
                                                        
52 GUK-BANG-BU, supra note 16, at 8. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. In response to national lawmakers’ inquiries, interestingly, the former Defense Minister Yang Ho Lee of 
the Kim Young Sam administration officially stated that it would not be a violation of the KAA, even if a North 
Korean naval ship crosses the NLL. Hee Sang Chung, A Line of Peace Turned into A Line of War, SISAIN, Dec. 
30, 2010, http://www.sisainlive.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=9118. 
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islands,” while Article 4 provides that “the Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall 
formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom 
and democracy.”55 South Korean constitutional scholars have suggested various points of 
view on the articles. Some argue that Article 3 prevails over Article 4; another argues that 
Article 4 takes precedence over Article 3; and, others call for a harmonious interpretation of 
the articles.56 Interestingly, both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court held that the 
entire Korean Peninsula appertains to South Korea’s territorial jurisdiction pursuant to the 
Article 3 of the ROK Constitution, though the latter left open a possibility to consider the 
special characteristic of the inter-Korean relations.57 According to the Courts, ironically, the 
NLL cannot be regarded as a maritime frontier because the Korean Peninsula and the 
territorial waters surrounding the Peninsula must be inherently appertained to the territory of 
the Republic of Korea. However, the Courts’ opinion is not inconsistent with the existence of 
the NLL, since it is possible to maintain the NLL as a de facto maritime demarcation line 
existing for particular purposes under the armistice system. 
 
c. Conflicting Public Opinions in South Korea 
 
In South Korea, the NLL conflict is more than a mere international legal dispute. In 
the aftermath of the First Yeonpyeong Naval Clash, the South Korean public became 
increasingly conservative in addressing the NLL conflict, believing that the NLL is the                                                         
55 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEON] [CONSTITUTION] art. 3, 4 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter ROK Constitution]. 
56 CHUL SOO KIM, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF KOREA 168–69 (20th ed. 2008). See also Seong Ho Jeh, Bun-Dan-
Gwa Tong-Il-E-Dae-Han Beob-Jeok Jaeng-Jeom [Main Legal Issues Concerning the Division and Unification 
of Korea] CHUNGANGBEOPHAK Je6Jip Je2Ho [CHUNG-ANG L. REV. Vol. 6-2] 67 (2004).  
57 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 90Da1451, Sept. 25, 1990 (S. Kor.); Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2003 Hun-
Ma114 (consol.), June 30, 2005, (17(1) KCCR, 879) (S. Kor.); Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2004Hun-
Ba68 (consol.), July 27, 2006 (18(2) KCCR 880) (S. Kor.); see also Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 89NU6396, Sept. 
28, 1990 (S. Kor.) (holding that the Copyright Act is still valid even in North Korea). However, by contrast, the 
Constitutional Court found that one of North Korean universities cannot be regarded as a South Korean 
university officially registered in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in spite of the article 3 of 
the ROK Constitution. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2006Hun-Ma679 (consol.), Nov. 30, 2006 (18(2) 
KCCR 549) (S. Kor.). 
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Maginot Line of maritime security. Yet many South Koreans are aware that the legality of the 
NLL is controversial. Moreover, many academics generally admit that the NLL does not fall 
within the scope of the legal concept of maritime border in the international law of the sea. 
However, they still assert that the NLL is an integral part of South Korea’s maritime 
sovereignty due to the fact that the Korean Peninsula is technically in a state of war.  
A statement by an anonymous law expert of the Foreign Ministry points out the 
conceptual confusion among South Koreans:  
 
[A]part from legal arguments, the NLL conflict has to be understood with other 
complexities. As a matter of international law, sovereign states can negotiate the 
delimitation of maritime border during peacetime. The ROK Constitution 
recognizes the Republic of Korea as the sole legitimate government of the Korean 
Peninsula. South Korea, therefore, should not defined the NLL as a maritime 
frontier, because North Korea is a legitimate state under the ROK Constitution. On 
the other hand, however, the Korean Peninsula is technically in a state of war. 
Therefore, South Korea cannot exercise her maritime jurisdiction over the northern 
part of the NLL. Nor does North Korea cross the NLL. In this respect, it should be 
admitted that the NLL performs the role as maritime border between the two 
Koreas.58  
 
 
In this circumstance, the Roh Moo Hyun Government’s approach of separating legal 
elements from politico-military elements brought about heated political debates in South 
Korea. The government publicly declined to define the NLL as a maritime frontier on the 
premise that the concept of a maritime demarcation line must be distinguished from a 
maritime border in international law. 59  This revolutionary view stimulated conservative 
national sentiment, and even affected the following presidential elections in South Korea.60 
Conservative groups harshly lashed out at the former president’s remark, defining it as an                                                         
58  Sung Sik Cho, Autopsy the NLL, SHINDONGA at 580 (2008), 
http://blog.daum.net/_blog/BlogTypeView.do?blogid=06g2L&articleno=16144382&categoryId=758161&regdt
=20101124001804#ajax_history_home. 
59  Roh Says the NLL Is Not a Sea Border, THE HANKYOREH, Oct. 11, 2007, 
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/bluehouse/242291.html. 
60 Su Heon Kim, Defense Ministry Confirms Roh’s Plan to Honor NLL, THE HANKYOREH, Oct. 9, 2013, 
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/606378.html; Jin Woo Kim, NIS: The Beginning and the 
End of the NLL Controversy, THE KYUNGHYAN SHINMUN, July 24, 2013, 
http://english.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=201307241024287&code=710100.  
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abandonment of the territory. As mentioned earlier, however, the NLL was unilaterally 
designated by the UNC in an intention to prevent South Korean naval forces or civilian crafts 
from advancing north after the Korean War.61 The NLL closely modeled “a line drawn in 
1961 with another name,” that was drawn to “prevent a certain possibility of naval conflicts 
by prohibiting either the UNC forces or the ROK forces from advancing north.”62 From its 
very beginning, the NLL has never been a maritime border between the two Koreas, though 
its purpose to separate military forces is consistent with its current role as a maritime 
demarcation line. 
 
2. Pyongyang’s Position 
 
 Since 1973, Pyongyang has persistently undermined the NLL. Soon after the West 
Sea Incident, the Rodong Daily, a Pyongyang-based newspaper, commented that “the seas 
around Haeju, Dungsangot and Ongjin Peninsula should be appertained to its jurisdiction on 
the basis of the rightful interpretation of the KAA.”63 In addition, Pyongyang claimed that 
South Korean vessels traveling to the NWI must receive prior permission from the North 
Korean maritime authority since the islands lay within its “coastal water.”64 Allegedly based 
on the interpretation of the article 2.13(b) of the KAA, Pyongyang suggested that a 
“hypothetical extension line stretching extended parallel to the latitude from the end of the 
provincial boundary line between Hwanghae-do Province and Gyeonggi-do Province” as an 
alternative line.65 In 1977, Pyongyang unilaterally proclaimed “200 nautical-mile of the EEZ”                                                         
61 Jon M. Van Dyke et al., The North/South Boundary Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea, 27 MARINE POL’Y. 143, 
143 (2003); see also Jeh, supra note 3, at 112.  
62  Jae Jeong Seo, A New Truth on the NLL Has Come Out, PRESSIAN, Mar. 23, 2001, 
http://www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=40110323132438&section=05 (quoting CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WEST COAST KOREAN ISLANDS (1974), available at 
http://weekly.changbi.com/attachment/1010299189.pdf) (last visited Aug. 29, 2014). 
63 Lee, supra note 4, at 545 (quoting RODONG DAILY, Dec. 1, 1973, at 5). 
64 Lee, supra note 4, at 546 (quoting RODONG DAILY, Dec. 3, 1973, at 6). 
65 Kim, supra note 15, at 483.  
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from its coastal baseline, followed by the establishment of the MWZ, although both zones 
appeared analogous. None of these actions took into account the NWI, although Pyongyang 
argued that the measures reflected the principle of equidistance as achieved in the 
UNCLOS.66  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Maritime Delimitation Claimed by North Korea 
Source: GUK-BANG-BU [THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA], BUK-BANG-HAN-GYE-SEON-
EUL DAI-HA-NEUN WOO-RI-EUI JA-SE [THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA POSITION REGARDING THE NORTHERN LIMIT 
LINE] (2nd ed. 2007) 19, available at http://www.military.co.kr/english/NLL/NLL.htm. 
 
 In the aftermath of the First Yeonpyeong Naval Clash, Pyongyang’s comment on the 
NLL was recorded as the first official opposition since the end of the Korean War. 67 
Pyongyang publicly opposed the NLL, saying that it “violently infringes on North Korea’s 
maritime sovereignty.” 68  At a ministry-level talk held on June 22, 1999, a Pyongyang 
representative contended that “[t]he NWI are situated within its territorial water….The KAA 
does not provide any legal basis of the NLL….Moreover the NLL is not based on any form 
                                                        
66  Cham-Yeo-Yeon-Dae [People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy], NLL Jaeng-Jeom-Gwa Dae-An 
[NLL: Problems and Solutions] (Nov. 22, 2011), at 8, http://www.peoplepower21.org/PSPD_press/962270 (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2014). 
67 Lee, supra note 4, at 551 (quoting RODONG DAILY, June 16, 1999, at 5). 
68 Lee, supra note 4, at 553. 
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of agreement….” 69  In this view, Pyongyang made it clear that “[t]he NLL was neither 
acknowledged nor recognized….Neither maritime demarcation line nor maritime border has 
ever been drawn between the NWI and the coastline….”70  
Pyongyang also invokes the UNCLOS in defense of its position in the NLL conflict. 
Pyongyang condemned the NLL as undermining the maritime sovereignty of North Korea in 
the following ways: the NLL encroaches on the territorial waters of North Korea, thereby 
infringing upon the maritime sovereignty guaranteed by the UNCLOS. 71  Pyongyang 
emphasized that each state is limitedly entitled to delimitate the territorial water boundary of 
an island within the territorial water of an opponent state only through mutual agreement and 
under special circumstances, such as an armistice system.72 Pyongyang therefore underscores 
that “[c]onsidering the UNCLOS, the disputed water appertains to North Korea’s maritime 
jurisdiction…therefore, fisheries in the water neither violate the KAA nor encroach the 
maritime sovereignty of South Korea.”73  
Furthermore, Pyongyang rebuts Seoul’s assertions by relying on the international law 
of territorial acquisition, including acquisitive prescription and the theory of historical 
consolidation.74 With respect to the theory of historical consolidation, Pyongyang points out 
that there was no form of recognition or acquiescence on its part, and also stresses that the 
theory requires at least acquiescence on the part of a concerned state to construct a claiming 
state’s historic title. 75  When it comes to the assertion based on acquisitive prescription, 
Pyongyang argues that acquisitive prescription restrictively legitimizes the violation of 
                                                        
69 Id. (quoting RODONG DAILY, June 23, 1999, at 5). 
70 Lee, supra note 4, at 553 (quoting RODONG DAILY, June 28, 1999, at 5). 
71 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 3, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS] (providing that “[E]very State has the right to 
establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles….”). 
72 Lee, supra note 4, at 554 (quoting RODONG DAILY, July 3, 1999, at 5); see also the UNCLOS, supra note 71, 
art. 15. 
73 Lee, supra note 4, at 554 (quoting RODONG DAILY, July 11, 1999, at 5). 
74 Lee, supra note 4, at 557 (quoting RODONG DAILY, Sept. 2, 1999, at 5; RODONG DAILY, Sept. 17, 1999, at 5; 
RODONG DAILY, Sept. 23, 1999, at 6). 
75 Lee, supra note 4, at 555 (quoting RODONG DAILY, Mar. 3, 2000, at 5). 
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another’s state’s territorial sovereignty and may be admitted only if the other state has 
acquiesced the possession for a considerable period of time without any affirmative protest.76 
Hence, Pyongyang concludes that “[S]eoul is not able to rely on the establishment of 
acquisitive prescription, insofar as it does not produce any reliable evidence to construct its 
alleged title.” 77  Pyongyang further insists that a “[m]ilitary demarcation line can be 
established both through mutual agreement and the KAA on the condition that Washington 
and Seoul give up their obsession with the current NLL.”78 
As part of its protest, Pyongyang proclaimed the CMDL in September 1999, followed 
by the Navigation Order of the Five Western Coastal Islands (“Navigation Order”). 
Compared to other alternatives, the CMDL is not parallel to the Latitude, but rather protrudes 
deep into the gulf of Gyeonggi.79 The CMDL is an extension from the end of the provincial 
boundary line between Hwanghae-do Province and Gyeonggi-do Province, although it 
arbitrarily connects multiple equidistant points between the corresponding islands.80 Relying 
on the CMDL, Pyongyang contested that the water north of the CMDL should be appertained 
to North Korea’s maritime jurisdiction, and warned that potential military action will be 
taken as a self-defensive measure.81 In other words, Pyongyang declined to follow the NLL 
as a de facto maritime demarcation line by suggesting the CMDL.82 The Navigation Order, as 
a follow-up measure of the CMDL, restricts navigations that enter into and come out from the 
NWI. 83  To be specific, it divides the water around the NWI into three parts: Zone 1-
Baekryong Island, Taechong Island and Sochung Island; Zone 2-Yeonpyeong Island and its 
                                                        
76 See Lee, supra note 4, at 555.  
77 Id. (quoting RODONG DAILY, Mar. 3, 2000, at 5).  
78 Lee, supra note 4, at 554 (quoting RODONG DAILY, July 3, 1999, at 5). 
79 Kim, supra note 15, at 485; see also Lee, supra note 4, at 556 (quoting RODONG DAILY, July 22, 1999). 
80 Kim, supra note 15, at 485. 
81 CHOONGANG DAILY, Sept. 3, 1999, at 1, 3; CHOSUN DAILY, Sept. 3, 1999, at 4.  
82 CHOSUN DAILY, Sept. 3, 1999, at 4. 
83 Lee, supra note 4, at 558 (quoting RODONG DAILY, Mar. 24, 2000, at 2); see also Lee, supra note 4, at 558-59 
(quoting CHO-SUN-CHOONG-ANG-NYEON-GAM [CHOSUN CENTRAL YEARBOOK] 530–31 (Cho-Sun-Choong-
Ang-Tong-Shin-Sa [Chosun Central News Agency] eds. 2001)). 
Hyun Jin Kim 
LL.M. Thesis 24 
vicinity; Zone 3-U Island. 84  Pyongyang requested that both civilian and military crafts 
navigating toward the NWI, particularly the Zone 1 or Zone 2, only use the designated sea-
lanes.85  
 
 
Figure 6: Declared Navigation Corridors 
Source: Evan Ramstad, Korea Crisis Has Roots in Border Row, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 2, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703961204575280472071130754. 
 
 In the wake of the Second Yeonpyeong Naval Clash which occurred in 2000, 
Pyongyang accused the South Korean military boats of the first strike against North Korean 
patrol ships, which had prevented the ships from performing their rightful duties within the 
legitimate maritime boundary.86 A Pyongyang representative officially condemned the NLL 
again, stating that “the South Korean boats provoked by infringing upon the territorial 
sovereignty of North Korea through a preemptive attack, while the North Korean navy only 
took self-defensive actions in response to that illegal attack.”87 Pyongyang also argued:  
 
The NLL was unilaterally drawn by the UNC in 1950s without any relevant 
notification. Therefore, the NLL does neither comply with the KAA nor 
fundamental principles of international law. But both Seoul and Washington have                                                         
84 Lee, supra note 4, at 558–59 (quoting CHO-SUN-CHOONG-ANG-NYEON-GAM [CHOSUN CENTRAL YEARBOOK] 
530–31 (Cho-Sun-Choong-Ang-Tong-Shin-Sa [Chosun Central News Agency] eds. 2001)). 
85 Kim, supra note 24, at 9. 
86 Lee, supra note 4, at 561 (quoting RODONG DAILY, July 2, 2002, at 4, 5). 
87 Lee, supra note 4, at 562 (quoting RODONG DAILY, July 4, 2002, at 5). 
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continually dismissed to redraw a maritime demarcation line in accordance with 
international law.88 
 
 
On the pretext of reconciling inter-Korean relations, Pyongyang suggested a new 
alternative line at the 6th South-North general-level talk held in 2007. The proposed line is 
different from both the NLL and the CMDL, even though Pyongyang did not clarify whether 
it is presented as a maritime demarcation line or maritime border.89 Interestingly, this line is 
analogous to the NLL in part: specifically, the waters between three of the NWI -Baekryong 
Island, Daechong Island and Sochung Island, and Jangsangot and the Ongjin Peninsula of the 
North Korean coastline; the waters between Haeju and Deungsangot, and the South Korean-
held Yeonpyeong Island. 90  Compared to the NLL, however, this alternative line extends 
farther south between Sochung Island and Yeonpyeong Island. Regardless of the fact that the 
South Korea’s de facto military control, Pyongyang claimed the 12 nm of the territorial water 
from its coastline, thereby incoporating the water at a distance of about 10 kilometers from 
the NLL into North Korea’s maritime jurisdiction.  
 
3. Maritime Border or Military Demarcation Line?91 
 
                                                        
88 Lee, supra note 4, at 562 (quoting RODONG DAILY, July 9, 2002, at 4; RODONG DAILY, July 10, 2002, at 4; 
RODONG DAILY, July 16, 2002, at 5; RODONG DAILY, Aug. 2, 2002, at 5). 
89 Professor Chung regards the new line must have been suggested as a maritime border, given the fact that it 
was initially not discussed at the U.S.–North Korea general-level talk which is irregularly held on behalf of the 
Military Armistice Commission (“MAC”), but instead discussed at the South-North general-level talk. Chung, 
supra note 6, at 266. However, it is still not sure whether Pyongyang considers the US-North Korea general-
level talk as the replacement of the MAC. Therefore it is speculated that Pyongyang might have wanted to 
negotiate with Seoul with respect to issues over maritime economic and security. As of now, Pyongyang’s 
underlying intention is not clear whether the new line was suggested as a maritime border, or as a maritime 
demarcation line at the 6th South-North general-level talk.  
90 Id. 
91 Professor Park even describes that “…the dispute over the NLL is not a matter of law, but military security 
concerns are deeply involved...moreover, the conceptual confusion therein appears to emerge from the 
discrepancy of legal interpretation.” Chun Ho Park, Maritime Issues Surrounding the Korean Peninsula, 76 
DIPLOMACY 35–6 (2006). 
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This is a highly debatable question that gives rise to strong differences of opinion 
between the two Koreas, who are still technically in a state of war. As mentioned earlier, the 
South Korean government, including the judiciary, does not recognize North Korea as a 
legitimate state. Logically speaking, therefore, it is ironic for South Korea to insist on the 
NLL as its maritime frontier. Throughout the conflict, Pyongyang explicitly distinguishes 
between the concept of maritime border and maritime demarcation line. However, apart from 
the controversy about the statehood of North Korea, it is still necessary to discuss whether the 
NLL falls within the scope of either concept under international law to focus on the main 
issue of the NLL conflict, which is the establishment of South Korea’s historic title to the 
NLL and the disputed waters. It must be remembered that the NLL conflict itself is not 
concerned with the delimitation of either the territorial sea or the EEZ in the Yellow/West 
Sea.92  
Pyongyang defines Seoul-led military drills as the use of force against its territorial 
water, particularly with respect to the water between Sochung Island and Yeonpyeong 
Island. 93 Pyongyang often suggests that a hypothetical maritime boundary should extend 
south of the water, far beyond the current NLL. As a matter of fact, the straight baseline 
segment of the NLL between the two South Korean-held islands is at a distance of 45 nm (83 
kilometers) that may not be incorporated into the territorial water of South Korea under 
general principles of the law of the sea.94  
On the contrary, Seoul refutes Pyongyang, arguing that military drills have been 
conducted within South Korea’s territorial boundary since the ROK MND recognizes the 
NLL as the maritime frontier. 95  The national sentiment prevailing in South Korea also 
highlights the symbolic status of the NLL as the maritime frontier that defends the NWI as                                                         
92 Lee, supra note 17, at 56. 
93 Chung, supra note 6, at 271. 
94 Id. at 267. 
95  Joint Chief of Staff Said Fire Drill Will be Resumed, THE HANKYOREH, Dec. 16, 2010 
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/454201.html. 
Hyun Jin Kim 
LL.M. Thesis 27 
well as Seoul metropolitan area. Some academics support the ROK MND, asserting that “as 
the NLL is the maritime border in the Yellow/West Sea, the waters lying south of the NLL 
appertains to the maritime jurisdiction of South Korea.”96 Depending on political tendencies, 
however, Seoul’s politicians are highly divided as to whether the NLL should be regarded as 
a maritime frontier of South Korea. To some extent, Seoul’s dogma has proscribed the 
development of legal arguments that may support Seoul’s position in light of international 
law. 
Strictly speaking, the NLL has significant flaws to be included into the concept of 
maritime border inasmuch as maritime border, in principle, must be distinguished from 
maritime demarcation line in terms of shape, object, and function. In terms of the 
international law of the sea, the term “territorial water” means a sea over which a coastal state 
is exclusively entitled to exercise its maritime jurisdiction, and “an adjacent belt of sea of a 
coastal State” in shape.97 By comparison, the term “military demarcation line” is drawn either 
vertically or horizontally in a linear form to separate belligerent parties by creating a buffer 
zone between them. Basically, a coastal state is entitled to exercise maritime sovereignty over 
its territorial water by using natural resources to deal with security, customs, and law 
enforcement. In comparison, a maritime demarcation line refers to a line drawn on the sea for 
particular purposes such as the separation of conflicting military forces.98 In this respect, 
Seoul’s position can be strengthened only if it views the NLL as a de facto maritime 
demarcation line established for the stability of the armistice system.99 It is also consistent 
                                                        
96 See Chung, supra note 6, at 257–68. 
97 UNCLOS, supra note 71, at art. 2. 
98 The DMZ is a good example legitimately performing as a military demarcation line in the Korean Peninsula. 
99 Still, however, the NLL may be considered as a valid maritime border, particularly with respect to some 
segments where the NWI and North Korea’s coastline are directly opposite to each other. Both the KAA Article 
2.15 and the UNCLOS Article 15 appear to accept the validity as well as the necessity. 
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with Henry Kissinger’s report, which points out an erroneous use of the term “territorial 
water” by South Korean officials.100 
In the absence of a legal basis, it is hard for Seoul to insist that the NLL is South 
Korea’s maritime frontier. Even assuming that the UNCLOS is applied to the NLL conflict, 
the NLL cannot be the maritime frontier in the Yellow/West Sea,101 since the NLL extends 
into the midst of the Shandong Peninsula of China and the Hwanghae-do Province.102 The 
western end of the NLL stretches far into the midst of the Shandong Peninsula of China and 
the Hwanghae-do Province of North Korea. Under the UNCLOS, Seoul’s claim of territorial 
title to such broad maritime areas may not be persuasive, as it overlaps with a large portion of 
the international waters, such as the high sea or the potential EEZ of China.103 In addition, the 
KAA does not provide, in its text, any basis for the NLL to serve as South Korea’s maritime 
frontier. Considering that the NLL blocks the coastline of North Korea, it may rather be a 
violation of the KAA.104  
Fortunately, however, the KAA, though it has no prescription for any form of a 
maritime demarcation line, generally covers post-war maritime management surrounding the 
Korean Peninsula: “[b]oth sides shall respect the water contiguous to the DMZ and to the 
land area under the military control of the opposing side, and not to engage in blockade of 
any kind in Korea.”105 Although the KAA does not use the term “territorial water,” it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that both sides acknowledge maritime concerns, by including the 
phrase “the water contiguous to the land area.” The following points also support the 
following conclusion. First, international law had no definition of territorial water at the time                                                         
100 Je Min Son, Kissinger “Unilaterally Drawn NLL Violates International Law,” THE KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN, 
Dec. 17, 2010, http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201012172153245&code=910303 
(citing SECRETARY OF STATE, SUMMARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECT OF NORTH KOREA BOAT/AIRCRAFT INCIDENT 
(1975)) (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). 
101 Jon Barry Kotch & Michael Abbey, Ending Naval Clashes on the Northern Limit Line and the Quest for a 
West Peace Regime, 27-2 ASIAN PERSP. 183, 188 (2003); see also Van Dyke et al., supra note 62, at 150. 
102 See UNCLOS, supra note 71, at art. 3; see also Chung, supra note 6, at 269. 
103 Chung, supra note 6, at 269. 
104 See KAA, supra note 9, at art. 2.15, 2.16. 
105 See id. 
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of the armistice negotiations.106 Second, the US-led UNC and Communist China that led the 
negotiations might have believed that border delimitation was beyond their authority. 107 
Third, the KAA take into account military objectives and it further presumes the 
establishment of a military demarcation line, other than the MDL.108 Lastly, the parties were 
concerned about issues over the maritime delimitation, given the fact that they debated over 
the breadth of the territorial water throughout the negotiations.109 In other words, the KAA 
provides a general framework for a maritime boundary between the two Koreas by using the 
phrase “the water contiguous to the land area shall be respected.”110 Considering the purpose 
of the KAA and the role of the NLL, the NLL should keep serving as a de facto military 
demarcation line to create a maritime buffer zone, until both Koreas settle this issue whether 
in courts or through diplomatic negotiation. 
 
                                                        
106 Chung, supra note 6, at 262; see also Cham-Yeo-Yeon-Dae, supra note 66.  
107 Chung, supra note 6, at 262. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. In 1968, the American idea based on the 3 nm rule was dismissed by North Korea who asserted the 12 
nm-rule in dealing with the Pueblo Incident, because Pyongyang unilaterally proclaimed the 12 nm of the 
territorial water in 1955, id. 
110 Id. 
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Figure 7: Areas Occupied by Each Side 
Source: THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, PROCEEDING MINUTE OF 
SOUTH AND NORTH MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE 5TH SESSION 283(1992). 
 
The NLL cannot be South Korea’s maritime frontier in the Yellow/West Sea in terms 
of international law. However, the NLL can still serve as a de facto maritime demarcation 
line between the two Koreas, though an issue over South Korea’s alleged historic title 
remains.111 It is undeniable that the NLL has been essential to the stable management of the 
KAA, even during the Cold War. 112 In defense of the NLL, therefore, South Korean legal 
writers have referenced many principles and theories. Some believe that the NLL has been 
historically consolidated as a de facto maritime demarcation line as years go by, because the 
parties of the KAA implicitly recognized the NLL at least as a temporary measure. Others 
argue that the NLL reflects unique circumstances surrounding the Korean Peninsula, thereby 
                                                        
111  GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO [National Assembly Research Service], BUK-BANG-HAN-GYE-SEON 
MOON-JE-WA DAE-EUNG-BANG-HYANG [THE NLL CONFLICT AND PLANS OF REACTION] 48 (2011). 
112 Kyung Hwan Chung, NLL Moon-Je-Eui Gi-Bon-Seong-Gyeok-Gwa Woo-Ri-Eui Dae-Eung-Jeong-Ryak [A 
Study on the Basic Character of the NLL Issues and Response Strategies] TONGILJEONRYAK Je8Kwon Je3Ho 
[UNIFICATION STRATEGY Vol. 8-3] 153, 164–68 (2008). 
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becoming an exception to general principles of international law.113 Yet, current literature 
lacks comprehensive analysis on international legal practices and jurisprudence of 
international courts and arbitrators. Accordingly, additional discussions are required to 
analyze South Korea’s alleged historic title to the NLL and the disputed waters by exploring 
the law relating to territorial acquisition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
113 See Cho, supra note 59.  
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Seoul 
 
Pyongyang 
 
 
 
 
 
 Legal Status of the NLL 
Though unilaterally drawn, 
it is a valid de facto 
demarcation line for the 
prevention of armed 
conflict under the 
armistice system. The 
UNCLOS is not applicable 
since the Korean Peninsula 
is technically in a state of 
war. 
It is an illegal line, which 
does not have any basis 
either in the KAA or in 
any form of international 
law. Therefore, it infringes 
upon North Korea’s 
territorial sovereignty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical Consolidation 
Under South Korea’s 
effective occupation, it has 
been consolidated as an 
international norm. 
Moreover, North Korea 
acquiesced to the NLL in 
many instances. 
A state may acquire 
territorial sovereignty over 
a particular territory when 
there is either agreement, 
recognition or 
acquiescence on the part of 
concerned states. 
However, was there any 
form of agreement on the 
existence of the NLL? Or, 
was there any form of 
recognition on the part of 
states involved? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acquisitive Prescription 
As inter-Korean practices 
indicate, Pyongyang has 
acted in compliance with 
the NLL since the War 
ended. 
The doctrine of acquisitive 
prescription is a legal 
mode of transferring 
sovereignty when an 
opponent state has 
acquiesced in the defective 
possession for a 
considerable period of 
time without any 
opposition.  However, 
North Korea has 
persistently opposed the 
NLL, though the 
U.S./South Korea always 
disregard that opposition. 
 
TABLE 1: Inter-Korean Dispute over the Legal Status of the NLL114 
 
 
 
                                                        
114 Lee, supra note 4, at 552–53. 
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II. DOCTRINAL BASIS OF THE THEORY OF HISTORICAL 
CONSOLIDATION 
 
A. Emergence of the Concept of Historical Consolidation 
 
1. The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 
 
The theory of historical consolidation was initially introduced in the Fisheries Case in 
which Norway and the United Kingdom disputed over the interpretation and the application 
of the Norwegian Royal Decree of 1935, which delimits the Norway’s territorial sea. In 
particular, a dictum of the Fisheries Case produced remarkable legal consequences for the 
development of the theory to deal with potential territorial disputes. In this case, International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) encountered the question of whether “[N]orway, as against other 
states, has acquired historic title to territorial waters so delimited by its system of straight 
baseline since 1869, even though this method was not proved as valid under general 
principles of international law.”115 Based on historical consolidation, the ICJ found Norway’s 
claim of historic title to the disputed water to be valid in part.116 More significantly, the ICJ 
upheld Norway’s straight baseline method of delimiting its territorial sea as “a traditional 
system of delimitation” that conforms to the general principles of international law.117 The 
finding can be summarized as follows: “the Norwegian system of delimiting her territorial 
water had acquired legal validity by way of ‘historical consolidation’ and thus becomes 
                                                        
115 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (7th ed. 2008).  
116 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. 2 1225 (1963) (citing Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case (U.K. v Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec.18) [hereinafter Fisheries Case]).  
117 MARJORIE, supra note 116.  
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‘enforceable as against all states.’” 118  This finding called on judges and academics to 
reconsider the traditional rules and principles governing territorial titles.119  
 In the Fisheries Case, notably, each party contributed to the development of the 
theory of historical consolidation. The Norwegian counsel’s main argument was that 
“[N]orway does not merely rely on historic title to justify her exceptional rights over the 
[disputed water]; however, she invokes history, as part of the entire claim, to justify the 
decree which is in consonance with the general rules of international law.”120 According to 
Norway, its straight baseline system is not a violation of universal law, but rather is an 
“expression of adaptation to concrete factual situations.”121 With regard to this argument, the 
ICJ stated: 
 
[T]his concept of an historic title is in consonance with the Norwegian 
Government’s understanding of the general rules of international law. In its view, 
these rules of international law take into account the diversity of facts and, 
therefore, concede that the drawing of baselines must be adapted to the special 
conditions obtaining in different regions. In its view, the system of delimitation 
applied in 1935, a system characterized by the use of straight lines, does not 
therefore infringe the general law; it is an adaptation rendered necessary by local 
conditions, [such as the general direction of the coast].122  
 
 
More precisely, the ICJ indicated an important constitutive element regarding the 
consolidation of historic title: with the existence of any opposition on the part of other states, 
acquiescence is required to establish the consolidation in a given dispute. Therefore, any 
opposition from other states would stop the process of consolidation of a historic title. Based 
on the facts and circumstances in this case, the ICJ found that the Norwegian government’s 
                                                        
118 Id. at 1227 (citing Fisheries Case, supra note 116, at 138).  
119 See D.H.N. Johnson, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1-2 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 145 (1952); see also 
Jens Evensen, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and Its Legal Consequences, 46-4 AM. J. INT’L L. 609 
(1952).  
120 MARJORIE, supra note 116, at 1226 (citing Fisheries Case, supra note 116, at 133). 
121 Artur Koztowski, Legal Construct of Historic Title to Territory in International Law: An Overview, 30 
POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 61, 66 (2010). 
122 Fisheries Case, supra note 116, at 134 (emphasis added). 
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consistent application of the method had never encountered any protest from foreign states.123 
The ICJ held: 
 
Norway has been in a position to argue without any contradiction that neither the 
promulgation of her Royal Decrees in 1869 and in 1889, nor their application, gave 
rise to any opposition on the part of foreign states. Since, moreover, these Royal 
Decrees constitute… the application of a well-defined and uniform system, it is 
indeed this system itself, which would reap the benefit of general toleration, the 
basis of an historical consolidation which would make it enforceable as against all 
States.124 
 
 
Overall, the ICJ determined that the existence of any opposition on the part of foreign states 
plays a significant role in assessing whether a state’s alleged historic title to particular 
territory has acquired erga omnes.  
In addition to the opposition requirement, the ICJ suggested other significant elements 
that have to be considered prior to the establishment of the consolidation of Norway’s 
historic title. The ICJ particularly mentioned: 
 
The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the international community, 
Great Britain’s position in the North Sea, her own interest in the question, and her 
prolonged abstention would in any case warrant Norway’s enforcement of her 
system against the United Kingdom.125 
 
 
Accordingly, the ICJ concluded: 
 
The method of straight lines, established in the Norwegian system, was imposed by 
the peculiar geography of the Norwegian coast; that even before the dispute arose, 
this method had been consolidated by a constant and sufficiently long practice, in 
the face of which the attitude of governments bears witness to the fact that they did 
not consider in to be contrary to international law.126                                                         
123 MARJORIE, supra note 116, at 1227. 
124 Fisheries Case, supra note 116, at 139 (emphasis added).  
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 140. 
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2. Confusing Terminology 
 
 In Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration, where sovereignty over the islands was in dispute, 
the terms “original title,” “traditional title,” and “original historic title,” were indiscriminately 
employed in describing Yemen’s assertion about its historic title.127 Regarding this differing 
terminology, particularly in the context of the law of the sea, Professor B. L. Ruderman 
explains: 
 
[T]he term “ancient title” should be reserved for legal claims which stretch back in 
time before the sea was transformed into res communis, while the term “historic 
title” refers to legal title which arose after the concept of freedom of the seas 
became an accepted part of international law.128 
 
 
This analysis shows that the formation of a historic title, as an exception to generally 
applicable principles, requires the fulfillment of more rigorous conditions than establishing 
ancient title. 129  To some extent, therefore, a claim of historic title is analogous to 
“prescription,” while a claim of ancient title seems to be linked to “discovery” and/or 
“appropriation through occupation.”130  
 Contrary to Ruderman’s approach, 131  Artur Koztowski highlights the similarity 
historic title and other titles mentioned above. He stresses a historic title as a source of 
                                                        
127 The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, Phase I: Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of Dispute (Eri. v. Yemen), 22 
R.I.A.A. 211, at 222, 317 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998) [hereinafter Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration]. 
128 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 95 (quoting B. L. Ruderman, The Doctrine of Ancient Title: Unknown Origins, 
Uncertain Future, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 769, 780, 785 (1987) (“The doctrine of ancient title derives from this 
concept of the seas as sovereignless territory.”)). 
129 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 95 ((quoting Ruderman, supra note 128, at 782, 788) (“Because ancient title is 
not an assertion of dominion over waters which are the property of the community of states, a state making an 
ancient title claim has a lesser burden than one asserting historic title.”)).  
130 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 95 (quoting Ruderman, supra note 128, at 783–86). 
131 See Ruderman, supra note 128, at 789 (asserting that the acceptance of historic title must be a foundation of 
the legitimacy of ancient title). 
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sovereignty as well as a reasonable solution to territorial disputes. 132 Koztowski asserts, 
based on “systematic efficiency and coherence,” that historic title is a legal “unity,” although 
its “meaning, importance, and construction” may vary according to the principle of 
“intertemporality.”133 Furthermore, Koztowski argues that the differing terminology merely 
reflects “the evolution of title,” thereby adopting various means of expression. Thus, it has no 
negative impact on the invocation of historic title in an individual territorial dispute.134 A 
State can thus contend the acquisition of historic title “regardless of whether it is a primary or 
secondary, or whether there are any competing claims against the alleged title.”135 In this 
sense, a State may claim a historic title to terra nullius, or claim the formation of title based 
on historical consolidation to a particular territory that was already ruled by another 
sovereign state. 136 Koztowski points out that the international community, which creates 
“norms, rules and principles” of customary international law, must individually evaluate the 
derivative feature of historic title.137 In other words, Koztowski believes that the international 
community should engage in an evaluation of the process of consolidation in a territorial 
dispute over historic title in order to ensure practicality and efficiency.138  
How, then, can coherence be achieved in interpreting historic title and the 
consolidation of historic title? And how are the two elements connected? As a legal method 
of obtaining territorial sovereignty, “[h]istoric right is the product of a lengthy process 
comprising a long series of acts, omissions and patters of behavior which, in their entirety, 
and through their cumulative effect, bring such rights into being and consolidate them into 
                                                        
132 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 95. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. (citing Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 80 (Oct. 16)).  
136 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 96. Contra Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17) 
(stating that “since both parties assert historic title (original or ancient title), the principles associated with the 
formation of title to res nullius could thus not be applied) [hereinafter Minquiers and Ecrehos Case]. 
137 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 96. 
138 Id. 
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rights valid in international law.”139 In the Fisheries Case, the ICJ implanted the concept of 
consolidation into the establishment of historic title. In the construction of historic right or 
title, “[c]onsolidation is an essential part of that lengthy legal process through which a State 
may acquire sovereignty over a particular territory.”140 Through the process of “historical 
consolidation,” therefore, a state may acquire “historic title” to or “historical right” over a 
particular land or sea that cannot be acquired though general international law.141  
 
B. Doctrinal Value of the Idea of Consolidation 
 
1. Complexities of the Doctrine of Acquisitive Prescription 
 
The doctrine of acquisitive prescription refers to a legal method of transferring 
territorial sovereignty. In principle, acquisitive prescription is analogous to the common law 
doctrine of adverse possession for private real estate, although it is often debated whether 
possession from time immemorial falls into the scope of acquisitive prescription. In 
international law, acquisitive prescription is defined as follows: “the result of the peaceable 
exercise of de facto sovereignty for a very long period over territory subject to the 
sovereignty of another.” 142 In short, acquisitive prescription involves a sovereign’s open 
encroachment upon a particular territory for a prolonged period of time, and also involves 
acting as a sovereign in the absence of any contention from the original sovereign.143 In 
modern international law, the broad definition of acquisitive prescription is categorized by 
                                                        
139 Y. Z. Blum, Historic Rights, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. II 711 (R. Bernhardt 
ed., 1995).  
140 S. P. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION, DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (1997). 
141 Blum, supra note 139, at 710.  
142 Randall Lesaffer, Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation and Acquisitive 
Prescription, 16-1 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 25, 46 (2005) (quoting STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (I. A. Shearer 
ed., 11th ed. 1994)). 
143 Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 46–7. 
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three different elements: immemorial possession which is invoked in a situation where “[t]he 
origin of a state of affairs is uncertain and may have been legal or illegal but is presumed to 
be legal;” usucapio bona fide requiring “[u]ninterrupted possession, justus titulus- even if it 
was defective, good faith, and continuance of possession for a period defined by the law”; 
and usucapio mala fide,- “[m]odified and applying under conditions of bad faith.”144 
 It is accepted that the doctrine of acquisitive prescription has existed as one of the 
traditional modes of acquiring title to territory,145 though a few still cast doubt on its basis in 
international law. 146  Regardless of which side they choose, however, international legal 
practitioners generally agree that the role of “immemorial possession” (straightforward 
possession), which essentially means “possession from time immemorial,” makes up part of 
the doctrine.147 In territorial disputes, immemorial possession was particularly invoked in 
cases where there was “no certainty about the origin of a long period of possession.” In the 
case of immemorial possession, this practice is “presumed legal.”148 Interestingly, scholars 
attempted to combine the concepts of “immemorial possession” and “prescription properly so 
called” under the larger heading of acquisitive prescription. However, there are still those 
                                                        
144 BROWNLIE, supra note 115, at 146–47. Indeed the second and third forms are not exactly the same as the 
Roman law usucapio, though international lawyers tend to acknowledge then as being close to the Roman 
concept. Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 47. This paper, however, will not particularly distinguish between 
usucapio bona and mala fide in explanation of adverse possession. In recent international legal practices over 
territorial disputes, in fact, there is no relevant adjudication directly applying either “praescriptio bona or mala 
fide.” SHARMA, supra note 140, at 113. For further detailed discussion on the doctrine of acquisitive prescription, 
see Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 46–56. 
145 Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 461, at 464 (Apr. 9) 
(separate opinion of Judge Mosler) (stating that acquisitive prescription is a “general principle of law within the 
meaning of Article 38, paragraph 1(c) of the Statute, by which lapse of time may remedy deficiencies of formal 
legal acts”).   
146 Land and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 629, at 678 (Sept. 11) (separate opinion 
of Judge Torres Bernardez) (insisting that “acquisitive prescription is a highly controversial concept which, for 
my part, I have the greatest difficulty in accepting as an established institute of international law”). 
147 D. H. N. Johnson, Consolidation as a Root of Title, 1955 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 215, 219 (1955); see also Lesaffer, 
supra note 143, 46–56. 
148 Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 46. 
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who strictly distinguish the two concepts.149 This tendency arises from a strong belief that 
adverse possession is a pure essence of prescription properly so called.150  
Indeed, the tendency is to distinguish prescription from occupation by implanting the 
element of adverse possession into acquisitive prescription. 151  Although acquisitive 
prescription and occupation are accepted as traditional means of acquiring territorial 
sovereignty, and both contain the element of “effective occupation,” 152  occupation and 
effective occupation relates territorial title to res nullius/terra nullius over which another 
state had no sovereignty before. 153 Therefore, in cases where a “wider belt of territorial 
waters” in the high seas are is at issue, a state may acquire exclusive rights only through 
acquisitive prescription. This is because the high seas are regarded as res communis in which 
many states share interests.154 In a situation that do not involve the high seas, but involve 
particular territory was fully governed by another sovereign, a state may also rely on 
prescription. 155  In this regard, it is obvious that acquisitive prescription, using adverse 
possession as its basis, is a legal method by which a “[s]tate can acquire a particular territory 
belonging either to other sovereigns or the international community.”156  
 
2. Consolidation as a Solution 
 
 Interestingly, in territorial disputes, international courts and arbitrators have not yet 
mentioned “acquisitive prescription in the sense of the Roman usucapio” as a sole source of 
                                                        
149 Id. 
150 Id.  
151 Johnson, supra note 147, at 220. 
152 Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 49.  
153 Johnson, supra note 147, at 219.  
154 Id. at 220.  
155 Id. 
156 Id. According to Johnson, the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case explicitly indicates that prescription essentially 
refers to a method of territory acquisition “through adverse possession,” id. at 221.  
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territorial title. 157  As indicated above, acquisitive prescription is designed to cure the 
defective title of a state that can prove its “[p]eaceful and uninterrupted possession of 
particular territory for a long period of time.” 158  Hence, logically speaking, a claim of 
acquisitive prescription does not have to assess other competing claims or titles on the part of 
foreign states. 159 In every territorial dispute, however, international jurisprudence usually 
involve “competing acts of sovereignty or possession of different states” that courts and 
tribunals have to assess.160 This may be the reason why it became necessary for international 
law to employ historical consolidation embracing various legal methods, such as acquisitive 
prescription and occupation, as a legal method. 
As a newly invented method of acquiring a territorial title, Professor Charles de 
Visscher introduced the concept of “consolidation” after his involvement in the Fisheries 
Case. The new approach highlights consolidation, which is distinguished from either 
occupation or acquisitive prescription.161 By introducing the so-called “theory of historical 
consolidation,” Professor de Visscher attempted to avoid certain ambiguities connected with 
the traditional classification of the legal modes of territorial acquisition, particularly with 
acquisitive prescription.162  
Immemorial possession and adverse possession are comprehensively combined under 
the theory of historical consolidation.163 As discussed above, scholars and judges, though 
they generally accept acquisitive prescription as a legal method, have resisted the 
combination of two different types of possession under the single title of acquisitive 
prescription. 164 Due to the theory, however, the concepts of acquisitive prescription and 
                                                        
157 Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 49. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORIES AND REALITY OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 244–45 (1953).  
162 See Johnson, supra note 147, at 219–22; see also Koztowski, supra note 121, at 90. 
163 Johnson, supra note 147, at 223. 
164 Id. at 219. 
Hyun Jin Kim 
LL.M. Thesis 42 
adverse possession may either be abandoned altogether, or confined to only cases concerning 
adverse possession.165  
 Furthermore, the theory of historical consolidation has significant implications for 
international law relating to territorial acquisition, given contemporary international 
jurisprudence that requires “a title be not only acquired, but also be continuously maintained, 
following ‘the conditions required by the evolution of law.’” 166 In a series of territorial 
disputes, international courts and arbitrators tend to focus on the maintenance of titles instead 
of the acquisition of titles. By adopting the idea of consolidation, the theory can now support 
the approach of international courts and arbitrators, because it places more emphasis on the 
process of maintenance and manifestation of sovereignty than other legal methods do. 
Obviously, the theory of historical consolidation also avoids the ambiguities and 
difficulties connected with the traditional modes of territorial acquisition, particularly with 
acquisitive prescription. The theory disproves the continuous efforts of international legal 
community to broaden and modify the doctrines of acquisitive prescription and occupation. 
Based on the theory, the concepts of immemorial possession and adverse possession, which 
give rise to the conceptual confusion, can be embraced under the single heading of historical 
consolidation. As a new legal mode of territorial acquisition, historical consolidation has 
resulted in another remarkable legal consequence. As indicated above, the theory underscores 
not only the acquisition of title, but also it emphasizes the maintenance of title through the 
gradual process of consolidation.167 In the sense of a territorial dispute, thus, the definition of 
historic title becomes much clearer by focusing on the process itself. More practical premises 
are available to resolve territorial disputes.168  
                                                         
165 Id. at 223.  
166 Id; see also the Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). In the aftermath 
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C. Systematic Interdependence between Historical Consolidation and Other Legal Methods 
 
 As indicated above, the systematic interdependence among the legal modes creates 
difficulties in interpreting and applying them properly. Unlike the case of other legal modes 
of territorial acquisition, international jurisprudence concerning historical consolidation take 
into consideration all relevant legal circumstances as to the exercise of sovereignty, 
particularly at the moment of materializing “consolidation” –the critical moment. 169 
Depending on the facts and circumstances in each case, a state’s action may form either a part 
of the establishment of historic title, or a part of other independent legal titles.170 In other 
words, a particular historical event may constitute another legal mode, although it appears to 
be related to historic title. 171  As repeated, historical consolidation is a product of 
comprehensive efforts to combine the diverse elements of occupation, immemorial 
possession and adverse possession under a single heading. Therefore, a state asserting 
historic title, before courts or arbitrators, should first determine whether its assertion is based 
on historic title or another title, since the same event may indicate a different legal mode.172 
Overlapping similarities and differences between historical consolidation and other legal 
modes must be clarified in advance.  
 
1. Occupation 
 
 Occupation refers to a traditional process of constructing “complete and exclusive 
sovereignty over a territory” belonging to no other sovereigns. A state can assert occupation 
even without reference to “acquiescence, tolerance or any other form of acceptance on the                                                         
169 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 92. 
170 Id. 
171 Id.  
172 Id. 
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part of foreign states,” contrary to a claim based on historical consolidation. 173 Because 
adverse possession constitutes the essence of historical consolidation, historical consolidation 
requires the toleration or acquiescence of other states or the generality of states. However, 
given that both occupation and consolidation demand the physical exercise of sovereignty, a 
state’s action, for instance “a peaceful appropriation of terra nullius,” may either form 
historic title or just initiate the process of consolidation.174  
As a primary legal mode of territorial acquisition, a state’s exercise of sovereignty 
accompanied by the “intention of appropriation” is an essential element of occupation.175 
Hence, both historical consolidation and occupation require the “actual exercise of effective 
sovereignty” to establish a territorial title, particularly in circumstances involving a peaceful 
appropriation of territory over which no other sovereignty has valid legal title. 176  As 
“possession of territory” plays a significant role in the formation of both legal modes, a state 
may assert a claim of historic title to stress its long period of possession as well as its positive 
legal influence on the alleged title.177 However, it is still plausible that competing states can 
assert the absence of acquiescence or tolerance on their part to prevent the establishment of 
the alleged title. To figure out whether the alleged title is formed, international courts and 
arbitrators will then evaluate the “degree of effective occupation” by examining all relevant 
facts and circumstances.178 In the absence of the proof of acquiescence or in the case of terra 
nullius, therefore, a claiming state would choose occupation as a basis of its claim, rather 
than historical consolidation.  
 
2. Prescriptive Rights (Acquisitive Prescription)                                                         
173 Id. at 93. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 94. 
177 Juridical Regime of Historic waters including historic bays-Study prepared by the Secretariat, [1962] 2 Y.B. 
Int’l L. Comm’n 80, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143 at 71 [hereinafter Juridical Regime].  
178 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 93. 
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 As discussed above, acquisitive prescription refers to a legal mode of territory 
acquisition that is only concerned with territories where some requisite conditions have been 
fulfilled over a long period of time.179 Particularly in disputes over maritime territories, a 
state may choose to argue for either immemorial possession or adverse possession. Compared 
to the case of immemorial possession, which is presumed to be legal, however, a state 
claiming adverse possession usually did not usually satisfy the conditions of valid legal 
possession at the beginning of the process.180 Regardless of a state’s choice in developing its 
claim, the essence of both modes lays in possession, like occupation and historical 
consolidation.181  
Strictly speaking, a claim relying on “adverse possession which by definition is an 
assertion of title against another sovereign state” tends to require a more stringent approach 
than a claim relying on immemorial possession, which is relatively more flexible in choosing 
a legal method to acquire title.182 Thus, the lapse of time requirement, by which is meant 
“such possession extends over a course of time,” is justifiable only for the case of 
immemorial possession.183 However, a state claiming historic title may still argue a parallel 
claim of acquisitive prescription in circumstances where the state is confident that its 
possession started from time immemorial.184  
In order to demonstrate the acquisition of territory, both adverse possession and 
immemorial possession have to deal with an issue over “uncertain starting date” of 
possession.185 Considering the “uncertainty” of immemorial possession, a state would prefer 
to choose adverse possession, since both share uncertainty regarding the precise starting date                                                         
179 Id. (quoting Juridical Regime, supra note 177, at 63). 
180 Juridical Regime, supra note 177, at 63. 
181 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 93 (quoting Juridical Regime, supra note 177, at 64). 
182 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 93 (quoting Juridical Regime, supra note 177, at 64). 
183 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 93 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
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of the acquisition of sovereignty.186 In this sense, a claim of acquisitive prescription may also 
be understood as a claim of historic title as long as the former contains an assertion based on 
possession from time immemorial.187 On the other hand, if a state claiming the acquisition of 
historic title relies on “defective and invalid” prescriptive possession, such a claim may be 
understood as an exception.188  
In conclusion, territorial possession accompanied by a claim of historical 
consolidation may help construct a title even in a circumstance where another state claims the 
existence of its earlier legal title to a given territory.189 Therefore, a title acquired through 
historical consolidation should not easily be defined as invalid or voidable at the first glance, 
because it may still be assessed as better or worse than another title. 190  The theory of 
historical consolidation is a hybrid model of the traditional legal modes of territorial 
acquisition. Based on historical consolidation, a state may claim its acquisition of historic 
title over terra nullius, or over particular territory that was already ruled by another sovereign 
state.191  
 
III. CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS OF HISTORIC TITLE 
 
According to Brownlie, historical consolidation was originally invented to deal with 
“the extension of sovereignty over res communis.”192 From this perspective, the “attitude of 
other states” or “toleration of foreign states or the international community” must be the most 
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significant element in the formation of historical consolidation.193 By themselves, however, 
these two concepts are not sufficient evidence proving the legality of an alleged historic 
title.194  
In the Fisheries Case, it was the British counsel that advanced the prerequisite 
conditions of historic title before the Court. The British argument can be summarized as 
follows:  
 
…reliance on historical title to a definite territory requires that the State asserting 
historic title demonstrate the exercise of a requisite amount of jurisdiction over the 
disputed territory over a long period of time, without adversarial claims by other 
governments, in such a fashion that the absence of adversarial claims would 
amount to a recognition of jurisdiction…such jurisdiction would be an exception to 
existing international law.195 
 
 
Although the Fisheries Court ruled in favor of Norway, it partially accepted the British 
argument in its verdict. The British argument is reflected in the Court’s finding, which lists 
multiple factors for assessing a claim of historic title: “the notoriety of the facts, the general 
toleration of the international community, the U.K.’s position in the North Sea, the U.K.’s 
own interest, the U.K.’s prolonged abstention, constant and sufficiently long practice, and 
even geographical conditions.”196 
 In the aftermath of the Fisheries Case, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) 
formulated three integral elements required for examining historic title in the light of 
territorial dispute. The ILC study covers the elements that are applicable to both land and 
maritime disputes.197 In order for international dispute resolution bodies to address a claim of 
historic title, the following three elements should be examined: “a) the exercise of authority                                                         
193 Id. Brownlie also believes that the Fisheries Court might have considered the UK government’s silence “[a]s 
an independent basis of legality of [Norway’s title] as against the British claim,” id.  
194 Id. at 156. 
195 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 70 (citing Fisheries Case, supra note 116, at 130).  
196 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 70 (citing Fisheries Case, supra note 116, at 139).  
197 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 70–1.  
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over the disputed area by the state claiming the historic right; b) the continuity of this 
exercise of authority; and c) the attitude of foreign states.”198  
As will be thoroughly discussed below, these three constitutive elements are closely 
connected with the concept of effective occupation, which also plays a crucial role in the 
determination of occupation, and acquisitive prescription in a given territorial dispute. 
However, it must be remembered that effective occupation was originally designed to govern 
disputes over terra nullius. 199  Since acquisitive prescription, occupation and historical 
consolidation stand on a common ground, it is worth exploring international legal practices 
and jurisprudence concerning effective occupation. In particular, effective occupation should 
be examined in connection with the requirement of acquiescence that will be discussed below. 
In several cases where prescriptive rights were invoked as a source of title, 
international courts and arbitrators defined effective occupation as “undisturbed, 
uninterrupted and unchallenged possession,” 200  “continuous and peaceful display of 
territorial sovereignty,”201 “continuous and peaceful display of authority, and the intention 
and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority.”202 In each 
individual dispute, however, international courts and arbitrators will determine which acts 
constitute a “display of territorial sovereignty” by deliberating specific circumstances.203  
                                                        
198 Juridical Regime, supra note 177, at ¶ 80. But see, BROWNLIE, supra note 115, at 156 (arguing that the term 
“attitude of foreign States” cannot cover all relevant elements thereof).  
199 JEREMIE GILBERT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S LAND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM VICTORS TO 
ACTORS 32 (2006). At the time of discovery, a State could acquire a title simply based on the discovery of 
particular territory insofar as the State proved the intention of appropriation as well as the fact of discovery. 
However, as discovery is no longer occurring and territorial competitions become heated, international law 
requires effective occupation in addition to an actual act of occupation. 
200 See Chamizal Case (Mex. v. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 309 (Perm. Ct. Arb. June 1911).  
201 Island of Palmas Case, supra note 166, at 839.  
202 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 45-46 [hereinafter 
Eastern Greenland Case]. 
203 Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 51 (citing Island of Palmas Case, supra 166, at 840); see also BROWNLIE, supra 
note 115, at 140. 
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In terms of effective occupation, the possessor of a territory must display its 
sovereignty in a peaceful way.204 Since the international law related to effective occupation 
requires more than the “absence of violence,” another state may stop the process of 
prescription or consolidation simply through “diplomatic protest.”205 Therefore, in the sense 
of effective occupation, the term “peaceful” may be understood as “acquiescence” on the part 
of foreign states.206 Inasmuch as the basic elements of effective occupation are related to the 
constitutive elements of historic title, further discussion is necessary for better understanding 
of the construction of historic title. However, it must be noted that an act of occupation may 
only be adduced as evidence demonstrating the fact of possession in the process of 
prescription or consolidation, and the act itself is not sufficient to establish a title.207 In many 
cases, therefore, judges and arbitrators will contemplate relevant factual and legal 
circumstances before rendering a decision.  
 
A. Sovereign Authority Required 
 
 As mentioned above, the ILC study sets forth “the effective exercise of sovereign 
authority over a defined territory by appropriate action on the part of the claiming state” as 
the first condition in consolidating an alleged historic title.208 In this view, a claiming state 
must exercise its governmental authority in a “visible and sovereign fashion” for a 
considerably long period of time, directed toward “the usage of the territory” at issue.209 The 
most important considerations for determining sovereign authority are “[t]he extent of the 
authority exercised, the relevant acts underlying such assertion of authority, and proof of 
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effectiveness of the authority exercised.”210 Even though the exercised sovereignty does not 
necessarily have to be absolute, 211  a state’s exercise of governmental activities must be 
unbounded over “the requisite prolonged period of time,” especially in cases where the state 
asserts “absolute sovereignty on the basis of historic title.”212  
Then how would judges or arbitrators decide the range and scope of required 
sovereign activities in support of a state’s claim of historic title? Insofar as activities are 
performed to uphold the sovereign authority, regardless of whether the legislature, executive 
or judicial branch is involved, all such activities of a particular state or its legal institution are 
entitled to support a claim of sovereignty over a disputed area. 213  However, there are 
limitations that activities must be “public, constituting an open manifestation of its will, and 
even achieving a state of recognition and notoriety.”214  
A claiming state must demonstrate its exercise of sovereign activities to the extent of 
“a high degree of effectiveness” in order for the activities to lead to the consolidation of a 
historic title.215 Thus, international courts and arbitrators must consider all particular and 
specific issues of a given territorial dispute when assessing the characteristic of sovereign 
activities. 216 In dealing with a claim of historic title, it is difficult to build a permanent 
                                                        
210 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 71. Moreover, the nature of a given claim is also an important factor to be 
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universal standard for determining the required sovereign activities without considering the 
particularities of specific circumstance.217 
 
B. Maintenance/Manifestation of Sovereign Authority 
 
The process of “maintaining” or “manifesting” territorial title over time is an integral 
part of the process of “consolidating” territorial sovereignty, though the required degree 
varies in accordance with situational circumstances.218  In order for a state to claim a historic 
title, there needs to be the manifestation of sovereign authority over a particular territory. 
This requirement is connected to the “[n]ational or internal usage” of territory requirement.219 
In terms of historical consolidation, it is not sufficient for a claiming state to passively retain 
sovereign authority over a disputed territory, because the theory calls for more engaging 
activities on the part of a claiming state. Therefore, a state must exercise its sovereign 
authority through the “[r]ealization of effective governmental actions.”220  
A state must manifest its territorial sovereignty “in a manner corresponding to the 
circumstances” so as to maintain its historic title to a particular territory.221 In that sense, a 
state must prove that the “actual display of sovereignty” has continuously existed and also 
“[d]id exist at the critical moment,” rather than arguing that the valid acquisition of its 
territorial sovereignty was completed at a certain moment.222 However, the required degree of 
maintenance or manifestation largely hinges upon whether there is another state competing 
against that alleged historic title. In other words, the presence of a competing claim would 
require a “considerable degree of manifestation,” while its absence would merely require that                                                         
217 Id. 
218 Johnson, supra note 147, at 225.  
219 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 74. 
220 Id.  
221 Of course, judges would still consider particular circumstances, such as whether a territory in question is 
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“loss by abandonment cannot be proved.”223 When a competing claim is absent, the alleged 
proprietor’s reaction must be “reasonably thorough and instantaneous” to win a case.224  
International legal practices take into account the lapse of time in evaluating effective 
occupation and therefore, “momentary occupation” is not sufficient.225 In relation to effective 
occupation, the lapse of time remains as an important factor in the assessment of the 
construction of historic title. In light of effective occupation and historical consolidation, 
however, international jurisprudence has no fixed model concerning the lapse of time. The 
ILC, though it did not suggest any specific guideline, provides that “repetitive or long-term 
activities” of a state asserting sovereign rights based on historic title must occur over a 
“considerable period of time” in a particular territory. 226 As of now, therefore, both the 
requirement of a concrete time length and the means of determining whether sufficient time 
elapsed are analyzed on a case-by-case basis.227  
 
C. Foreign States Attitude228 
 
                                                        
223 Id. at 224–25.  
224 Id. at 225. In the Island of Palmas Case, the arbitrators found Spain’s losing title –if she ever had it- on the 
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inasmuch as she took “immediate steps” as soon as competing claims were raised against her title, even if her 
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Decision Involving Questions of International Law, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 390).  
225 Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 55. 
226 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 73. 
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Generally speaking, a state may not acquire sovereignty over the high seas. See UNCLOS, supra note 71, art. 82. 
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acquiescence and prescription. MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 609 (6th ed. 2008). In light of 
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In addition to the second requirement, which focuses on the internal aspect of usage, 
the theory of historical consolidation requires an external aspect of usage in the establishment 
of historic title. In this regard, the theory calls on judges and arbitrators to deliberate the role 
of foreign states when determining the international usage of a particular territory. 
 
1. The Element of Acquiescence in Effective Occupation 
 
As briefly mentioned earlier, this element is closely linked to the prerequisites for 
effective occupation, i.e., peaceful possession and/or acquiescence, although the latter 
particularly concerns terra nullius. As noted, the theory of historical consolidation has its root 
in the doctrine of acquisitive prescription and occupation. Thus, a “continuous display of 
sovereignty” – more precisely, “effective exercise of territorial jurisdiction or sovereignty” – 
has essentially been required by international legal practices.229 Also, the prerequisites of 
acquisitive prescription resemble those of effective occupation. 230  Given that historical 
consolidation shares common ground with the traditional legal modes, it is worth exploring 
international jurisprudence on effective occupation to help understand the constitutive 
elements of historical consolidation.231  
Effective occupation is defined as “undisturbed, uninterrupted and unchallenged 
possession,”232 “continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty,”233 “continuous 
and peaceful display of authority, and the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some 
                                                        
229  Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 49, 55. In international adjudications, various terms, such as effectivités, 
possession, display of territorial sovereignty, effective occupation and effective administration, have been 
employed, id. at 54.  
230 Id. 
231 Indeed, both prescription and occupation need effective occupation of territory to be established. However, 
effective occupation refers to the Roman law occupatio in the case of terra nullius, while it, on the other hand, 
refers to the Roman law possessio in the case of prescription. BROWNLIE, supra note 115, at 138–39. 
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actual exercise or display of such authority.” 234 To some extent, effective occupation is 
related to the third required element of historic title, while it is also generally related to the 
first and the second elements. Yet it is clear that effective occupation has the closest 
connection to acquiescence since effective occupation also pays attention to undisturbed and 
peaceful possession of a particular territory.   
In each individual dispute, international courts and arbitrators determine what 
constitutes a “display of territorial sovereignty,”235 and whether the possessor of a territory 
displays its sovereignty in a peaceable way.236 In the light of effective occupation, “peaceable” 
can be interpreted as “acquiescence” on the part of competing states. 237  As the term 
“peaceable” requires more than the “absence of violence,” a concerned state can stop the 
process of prescription or consolidation simply by posing “diplomatic protest.”238  
However, the standard is not absolute, but relative. Even though international 
jurisprudence does not articulate “what actions constitute effective occupation,” it has 
attempted to evaluate state parties’ positive actions, reactions against other states’ exercise of 
sovereignty, and even omission – particularly acquiescence.239 As recent cases indicate, there 
are certain criteria that international courts and arbitrators have adopted in the assessment of 
effective occupation: for example, the exercise of sovereign authority must pertain to the 
disputed territory;240 and a state may exercise its sovereignty by itself,241 authorize individual 
activities on behalf of a state, 242  or confer a form of license upon corporations or 
companies.243 In the process of acquisitive prescription or historical consolidation, however, 
                                                        
234 Eastern Greenland Case, supra note 202, at 45-6. 
235 Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 51 (citing Island of Palmas Case, supra 166, at 840); see also BROWNLIE, supra 
note 115, at 140. 
236 Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 51. 
237 Id. 
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239 Id. at 54. 
240 Pulau Ligitan/Pulau Sipadan Case, supra note 214, at ¶ 136. 
241 See Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, supra note 136, at 65, 69. 
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such an act, which involves occupation or possession, can only be treated as evidence 
indicating the fact of possession. Therefore, effective occupation can be at best one of many 
constitutive conditions.244  
 
2. Acquiescence or Tolerance on the Part of Third States 
 
When a historic title was at issue before international courts and arbitrators, they had 
to decide whether the historic title is a static and permanent title, or just a consequence of the 
process of maintaining or manifesting sovereignty on the part of a claiming state. 245 
Regarding this issue, some judges identified so-called “progressive consolidation or 
recognition” in their individual opinions attached to the Maritime Delimitation and 
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain Case (“Qatar-Bahrain Case”). The judges 
found that “[Q]atar possesses a historic title to the Hawars for a period of 45 years 
accompanied with indirect conduct of recognition from Bahrain and third states, including 
international agreements between them, and thus the title had been progressively established, 
consolidated and recognized.”246 This finding indicates the link between the consolidation of 
historic title and “acquiescence, tolerance, and the acceptance of the status quo.”247 
 The requirement related to the attitude of foreign states was previously understood in 
connection with the concept of acquiescence and recognition, but the ILC later replaced this 
approach.248 According to the ILC study, acquiescence is considered important particularly in 
situations where the “[l]egal title to particular territory has already been questioned or 
                                                        
244 Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 54–5. 
245 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 91. 
246 Id. (citing Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr), 2001 
I.C.J. 40, at 172, 174, 180-4 (Mar. 16) [hereinafter Qatar-Bahrain Case]). 
247 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 92.  
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contested.”249 In other words, the concept, if applicable, plays a significant role in cases 
where a claiming state sets forth the formation of historic title on the basis of a “separate 
form of legal title.”250 In this view, the ILC study concludes that “[i]n order to establish 
historic title, the lapse of time would be immaterial, if the continued exercise of sovereignty 
during a length of time had to be validated by acquiescence in the meaning of consent by the 
foreign states concerned.”251 Instead of the original understanding of acquiescence as a form 
of agreement, the ILC suggests “[t]he lack of merely inaction or toleration” in order to 
reconcile certain conceptual confusion that may arise therefrom.252 The ILC’s effort, which 
particularly favors “toleration over acquiescence,” appears to eliminate acquiescence from 
the construction of historic title. 253  According to the ILC, a state must demonstrate the 
concerned foreign state’s recognition of its historic title by showing the absence of inaction 
or toleration.254  
 Importantly, the positive and negative aspects of “qualified silence” must be 
understood separately in the context of historical consolidation. In other words, the positive 
aspect refers to a “state’s agreement to an existing state of affairs,” whereas the negative 
aspect means that “a state is simply aware of the issue” to the extent that it does not constitute 
agreement.255 In each individual instance, the establishment of historic title can be achieved 
by relying on the “principles of good faith and legitimacy.”256 Therefore, if a foreign state 
changes its attitude and then launches a protest, it may be viewed as a “[p]otential violation 
of good faith or in other words protection of legitimate legal expectations.”257 Hence, if a 
                                                        
249 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 74. 
250 Id. at 74. 
251 Id. at 74 (quoting Juridical Regime, supra note 177, ¶ 107).  
252 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 74. The lack of inaction or toleration specifically refers to a situation where 
there is no “[f]orm of interference on the part of third States into the sovereign powers asserted by a State over a 
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state wishes to strengthen its claim of historic title,” the state had better invoke the doctrine of 
estoppel or good faith.258  
As mentioned earlier, international jurisprudence gave up the notions of justus titulus 
and bona fide as a requirement, since a fixed lapse of time is not always easy to be designated 
in the sense of acquisitive prescription.259 Similarly, in the case of acquiescence, there are no 
fixed criteria on how long other states must remain silent. For sure, however, judges and 
arbitrators consider whether a state has fulfilled effective control over a particular territory 
during a certain period of time. 260 Momentary occupation is not sufficient to verify the 
existence of effective control. As a result, international legal practices only require “peaceful 
and undisturbed possession” or “effective occupation” for assessing the exercise of sovereign 
authority. 261  Based on the facts and circumstances in each dispute, international dispute 
resolution institutions determine “whether the exercise of sovereignty has been peaceful or 
not, uninterrupted or not, or public or not.” 262  Therefore, whether a claiming state’s 
possession of particular territory was peaceful and uninterrupted by others will be determined 
by a case-by-case basis in order to clarify the existence of acquiescence. In an individual case, 
however, acquiescence is just one of many elements in evaluating state actions. For instance, 
other elements may include “recognition, preclusion, affiliations of the inhabitants, 
geographical, economic and historical considerations.”263 Therefore, in a real dispute, a state 
that provides the “most convincing evidence for the most convincing behavior as sovereign, 
including acquiescence,” wins.264 
 
3. Burden of Proof                                                         
258 Id. 
259 Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 50. 
260 Id. at 55. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 52. 
264 Id. at 55.  
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 Pursuant to the general rules of litigation, a state asserting historic title to a particular 
territory must establish the constitutive elements before judges and arbitrators.265 The burden 
of proof lies on a state that refers a case to tribunals, regardless of whether the state party 
claims its historic title or argues against it.266 The ILC study finds: 
 
The elements of the title have evidently to be proved to the satisfaction of the 
arbitrator, otherwise he will not accept the title. And this holds true whether or not 
the title is considered to be an exception to the general rules of international law, 
so that burden of proof is not really a logical consequence of the allegedly 
exceptional character of the title.267 
 
 
Particularly, a state alleging the exercise of its sovereign authority must produce 
relevant facts and evidence of the “requisite acquiescence or tolerance” on the part of third-
party states in order to support the formation of its historic title.268 On the other hand, a state 
arguing against the formation must present “sufficient facts and evidence,” which prove that 
the constitutive requirements of historic title have not been fulfilled.269 Judges and arbitrators 
will also contemplate whether the international community has shown the requisite 
acquiescence or tolerance, or whether there is a “lack of such acquiescence or tolerance on 
the part of a sufficient number of third-party states.” 270 Even if a state claims a limited 
historic title, the claiming state still bears the burden of proving its exercise of sovereign 
authority, which supports its claim of limited sovereignty over a disputed area.271  
 
4. Protest                                                         
265 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 78. 
266 Id. 
267 Juridical Regime, supra note 177, ¶ 158. 
268 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 78. 
269 Id. 
270 Id.  
271 Id. at 71 (quoting Juridical Regime, supra note at 177, ¶ 85). 
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 A strong basis for claiming historic title is evident when a state continually exercises 
its effective sovereignty over a given territory for a considerable length of time and under the 
toleration of other states.272 What if third-party states with competing claims or interests 
properly protest against another state’s exercise of sovereignty over a given territory? Also, 
when is the appropriate time to launch the protest? 
Although a third-party state can launch an official protest to prevent the formation of 
an alleged historic title, the ILC study requires that “such an act of protest must 
unequivocally express effective and sustained opposition to the exercise of sovereignty 
against specific actions undertaken by the state claiming sovereignty over the area in 
question.”273 Moreover, a protest based on competing title to a particular territory should be 
accompanied by affirmative action against an open and public exercise of sovereignty over 
the territory.274 In a case involving an open and public exercise of sovereignty on the part of a 
claiming state, a competing state is not allowed to assert its lack of actual knowledge on the 
exercise insofar as it “imputes knowledge thereof to all third states with competing claims or 
interests.”275 Of course, it remains as a matter of judgment subject to particular circumstances 
in a particular dispute. However, there is a minimum requirement that a protest against the 
exercise of sovereignty over a given territory be widespread, rather than arise from only a 
single state’s opposition.276 
Then, when should the protest be launched? In order to effectively oppose another 
state’s exercise of sovereignty over a given territory, the opposition should be lodged “during                                                         
272 Id. at 75. 
273 Id. (quoting Juridical Regime, supra note 177, ¶ 115). 
274 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 76. 
275  Id. Hence, the ILC holds that “open and public exercise of sovereignty is required rather than actual 
knowledge by the foreign States in the area,” Juridical Regime, supra note 177, at ¶ 130. 
276 Juridical Regime, supra note 177, at ¶ 116, ¶ 119. In this regard, in the Fisheries Case, the Court deemed the 
British opposition against Norway’s delimitation as significant since it had important interests in the North Sea, 
and the result of the dispute was directly related to the restriction of fishing right in the disputed area, Koztowski, 
supra note 121, at 75. 
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the formative period of the disputed title” before the final establishment of an alleged historic 
title.277 The ILC study supports this time frame, asserting that a protest cannot reverse an 
established fact after “[a] state has exercised its sovereignty over a particular area during a 
considerable period of time under general toleration by other states.”278  This is because an 
established historic title is already in existence and cannot be defeated by “belated 
opposition.”279 However, the ILC repeatedly stresses that both “the lapse of time necessary 
for the emergence of historic title and the amount of protest necessary to defeat general 
toleration” need to be individually examined on a case-by-case basis.280  
 
D. Additional Considerations 
 
 Even though the basic elements outlined above are required to construct historic title, 
assessing the fulfillment is “a matter of judgment and appreciation” in each individual 
case. 281 In other words, those constitutive elements of historic title are not absolute, but 
relative. Therefore, international courts and arbitrators will take into account all 
circumstantial conditions prior to adjudicating each dispute concerning a claim of historic 
title. For instance, “geographical features, the shape of a given territory and significant 
interests of states involved” may also be examined for the construction of historic title.282 
Conversely, unstable situations that bring constant changes to the operative facts, such as 
location and shape of a given territory, may disrupt the construction of historical title.283  
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 In assessing the effect of the relation between the three elements and other potential 
elements, some believe that a formalized approach is necessary to produce concrete methods 
or patterns.284 However, in order to determine the formation of historic title in each dispute, 
rigorous formality is not always helpful since “[t]he particular circumstances such as the 
geographical characteristics may in one case weaken the need to show usage over a 
substantial period of time, and in another case strengthen the necessity, even to the point of 
requiring documentary possession from time immemorial.”285 
 
IV. DEBATING THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOUTH 
KOREAN HISTORIC TITLE  
 
A. Historical Consolidation as a Source of South Korea’s Sovereignty over the NLL and 
the Disputed Water 
 
 The first legal issue concerning the NLL conflict is whether the NLL is a valid 
straight baseline as a de facto maritime demarcation line in the Yellow/West Sea in terms of 
the theory of historical consolidation. Aside from the NLL’s basis in international law as a 
maritime border, its legal basis as a de facto demarcation line may be implied in KAA 
Articles 2.15 and 2.16. In the Fisheries Case, the Norwegian Royal Decree of a straight 
baseline was also characterized as a valid method of territorial delimitation regardless of the 
lack of legal basis in international law. Therefore, it should be discussed whether the theory 
supports the NLL’s basis as a de facto demarcation line under the armistice system. 
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 The second issue concerning the NLL conflict is whether South Korea’s claim of 
historic title to the water lying south of the NLL has been consolidated. To be specific, the 
disputed waters refer to the water between Baekryong Island and the westernmost point of the 
NLL, the water between Sochung Island and Yeonpyeong Island, the water between 
Yeonpyeong Island and U Island, and the water between U Island and the Han River Estuary. 
Since the disputed waters may be considered either as part of the high sea or as part of 
China’s potential EEZ, Seoul seeks to construct its historic title, just as Norway acquired its 
historic title through the process of consolidation for erga omnes.286  
 
1. Occupation or Acquisitive Prescription 
 
 In an individual territorial dispute, it is crucial for a claiming state to decide which 
legal method it will rely on. Depending on the circumstances, a certain sovereign act may be 
used to claim historical consolidation or to claim another legal method of territorial 
acquisition.287  
 First, occupation cannot be invoked as a source of South Korea’s alleged title to the 
NLL and the disputed waters, since the mode deals with issues over terra nullius.288 Even if 
South Korea asserts the acquisition of title without reference to any form of recognition on 
North Korea’s part, the NLL conflict is not concerned with terra nullius. Instead, the disputed 
waters might be considered either as the high sea or part of another sovereign’s maritime 
areas, which the international law of the sea regards as res communis.289 In disputes where a 
                                                        
286 MARJORIE, supra note 116, at 1227 (citing Fisheries Case, supra note 116, at 138).  
287 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 92. 
288 Johnson, supra note 147, at 219. 
289 Ruderman, supra note 128, at 780, 785. 
Hyun Jin Kim 
LL.M. Thesis 63 
“wider belt of territorial waters” in the high seas is at issue, a state may acquire exclusive 
rights only through acquisitive prescription.290 
 Secondly, in principle, acquisitive prescription is not relevant to the NLL conflict 
because North Korea is not an original sovereign of the NLL and the disputed waters. 
Acquisitive prescription confers sovereign title to a particular territory when there is no 
protest by the original sovereign and when there is an open encroachment by the new 
sovereign for a prolonged period of time.291 Based on acquisitive prescription, therefore, a 
state may acquire a particular territory even if it was fully governed by another sovereign 
state.292 In the NLL conflict, however, North Korea did not have any original sovereign title 
to the NLL or the disputed waters. As mentioned earlier, the waters between the NWI and 
North Korea’s coastline inherently appertain to the territorial waters of each side, and the 
disputed waters may belong to the international waters.  
 
2. Applying Historical Consolidation: Focusing on Similarities with the Fisheries Case 
 
Due to the doctrinal difference between occupation and acquisitive prescription, it 
seems appropriate for Seoul to claim historical consolidation as a source of its sovereign right 
over the NLL and the disputed waters. 293 Based on historical consolidation, a state may 
acquire sovereignty over either terra nullius or res communis,294 and may also acquire either 
primary or secondary territorial title regardless of competing claims.295 Moreover, a state 
may claim historical consolidation to a particular territory even if another sovereign already 
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ruled it.296 It is not proper for South Korea to invoke acquisitive prescription in the NLL 
conflict because the mode does not usually situations, which involve competing claims or 
possession on the part of foreign states.297  
Since 1973, North Korea has claimed its maritime jurisdiction over the waters north 
of the CMDL, which appear to be a mirror image of the NLL, except for the territorial waters 
of the NWI.298 However, the CMDL does not have any legal basis in international law, and it 
significantly disregards the maritime sovereignty of the NWI. As both the NLL and the 
CMDL cover a large portion of the international waters, the NLL conflict should be defined 
as a maritime dispute over res communis involving competing claims and possession. Given 
that historical consolidation contains the element of adverse possession and requires 
acquiescence on the part of other states in its establishment, a winning side of the NLL 
conflict may assert erga omnes against the neighboring states concerned. Hence, Seoul’s 
reliance on historical consolidation seems appropriate in order to identify its alleged historic 
title. 
 More importantly, the Fisheries Case indicates why historical consolidation is the 
most appropriate legal method for resolving the NLL conflict, considering that the two cases 
share a common ground in both factual and legal aspects. In the Fisheries Case, the ICJ had 
to decide whether Norway had acquired historic title to territorial waters so delimited by its 
unique system of straight baseline, even though the method of delimitation was seemingly 
invalid under the general principles of international law. 299  In reliance on historical 
consolidation, the ICJ ruled that the Norwegian method of delimiting territorial water                                                         
296 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 94, 96. Contra Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, supra note 136 (stating that 
“since both parties assert historic title (original or ancient title), the principles associated with the formation of 
title to res nullius could thus not be applied). 
297 Id. 
298 Please refer to the map introduced here, Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., The Cheonan Incident and North Korea’s 
Northern Limit Line Strategy, CENTER FOR DEFENSE STUDIES (May 25, 2010, 4: 28 PM), 
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visited Aug. 29, 2014).  
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conforms to international law as a traditional system, thereby accepting both Norway’s title 
to the straight baseline and the delimited waters.300 Furthermore, the ICJ emphasized that 
Norway was not violating universal law since the method is an adaptation to the special 
geographical conditions surrounding the maritime area. 301 Therefore, both the Norwegian 
Royal Decree and Norway’s title to territorial waters were found to be legal through 
historical consolidation, and have thus become “enforceable as against all states.”302  
  The Fisheries Case and the NLL are analogous to each other in the following ways. 
First, the Fisheries Court adjudicated the legality of the Norwegian straight baseline system 
adapted to the specific geological circumstances of Norway’s coastline. Similarly, in the NLL 
conflict, it is debated whether the NLL has been historically consolidated as a valid straight 
baseline under the specific circumstances surrounding the Korean Peninsula, such as an on-
going state of war. Secondly, the ICJ, based on historical consolidation, admitted Norway’s 
title to the disputed territorial water delimited by its unique straight baseline system 
embodied in the Royal Decree of 1935. In the NLL conflict, South Korea also asserts its 
acquisition of historic title to the disputed water lying south of the NLL.  
 
B. Did South Korea Fulfill the Conditions Required to Consolidate Historic Title? 
 
1. Considering Sovereign Activities on the part of South Korea 
 
In order to claim the consolidation of historic title, a state must prove, to the extent of 
a “high degree of effectiveness,” that it exercised governmental authority in a very visible 
and sovereign fashion for a considerable period of time, directed its exercise toward “the 
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usage of the territory” at issue.303 In terms of the construction of historic title, the range of 
required sovereign activities covers legislative, administrative, and even judicial activities 
that are directed toward a particular territory. 304  Since there is no universal standard, 
international dispute resolution organizations will take particular circumstances into 
consideration in each individual dispute.305 
In the NLL conflict, South Korea has continually exercised its rights and duties as a 
coastal state before and after North Korea’s first protest in 1973.306 However, some may cast 
doubt on the degree of effectiveness due to the absence of South Korean domestic legislation 
prescribing the NLL.307 In fact, the relevant South Korea’s statute only declares the territorial 
water up to 12 nm and only prescribes the discontinued straight baselines around the NLL.308 
Indeed, the Presidential Decree of the Territorial Water and Contiguous Zone Act only 
describes the territorial water only up to Soryung Island, which is situated south of the NWI 
and does not mention the territorial water boundaries of the NWI.309 Therefore it is often 
debated that South Korea lacks its exercise of sovereignty in governing the NLL. In South 
Korea, there was no attempt to enact any statute even under North Korea’s constant 
challenges against the NLL. However, the absence of domestic legislations does not 
automatically prove the absence of required sovereign authorities, since a state can still 
manifest its sovereignty through administrative or judicial actions. Throughout the NLL 
conflict, South Korea has continually exercised its administrative and military authorities                                                         
303 Id. (quoting Juridical Regime, supra note 177, ¶ 80); see also Koztowski, supra note 121, at 73. 
304 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 72. In this context, the activities of natural persons or private legal entities are 
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around the NLL. For instance, the South Korean forces, sometimes jointly with the U.S. 
forces, have regularly conducted joint military drills around the NLL and the disputed 
waters.310 Even in the middle of military confrontations, South Korea never abandoned the 
enforcement of a general power of maritime police authority over the NLL and its vicinity. 
The authority enforced is particularly concerned with matters of security and marine 
resources management, including the regulation of illegal fishing by Chinese trawlers.311  
 
2. Process of Consolidation during 1953 and 1973 
 
As indicated earlier, “maintaining” or “manifesting” territorial title over time is the 
essence of the process of “consolidating” sovereign title to a particular territory, though the 
degree required varies by circumstance.312 The presence of competing claims would require 
“considerable degree of maintenance or manifestation of sovereignty,” while their absence 
would only require that “loss by abandonment cannot be proved.”313 Other than this degree 
requirement, international jurisprudence has yet to achieve any fixed model of the required 
lapse of time. The ILC study provides that “repetitive or long-term activities” of a state 
asserting sovereign rights based on historic title must occur over a “considerable period of 
time” over the particular territory in dispute. 314 As of now, either the length of required 
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amount of time or the method of measuring the length may de determined by a case-by-case 
basis.315  
Considering the particular circumstances in the Korean Peninsula, South Korea 
maintained and manifested its sovereignty by governing the NWI and conducting regular 
military operations for decades. In determining the required manifestation of sovereignty, a 
concrete length of time would be decided on a case-by-case basis. In the NLL conflict, the 
first two-decade period, between 1953 and 1973, seems to be sufficient as a “considerable 
period of time” given the state of war. First, both sides had debates over the delimitation of a 
maritime demarcation line, though they did not reach an agreement on that. Second, both 
sides were belligerent parties who had just agreed to stop the War and were highly sensitive 
to the acquisition of territories. Third, the ROK MND presents multiple historical instances 
where North Korea had acted in recognition of the NLL during the first two decades. As a 
matter of fact, North Korea never raised any official opposition to South Korea’s exercise of 
sovereignty over the NLL and the disputed waters during 1953 and 1973. As discussed above, 
since there was no opposing claim against the NLL during the period, South Korea can prove 
its manifestation of sovereignty by showing that it did not abandon the disputed waters 
during its possession. Rather than abandoning the NLL, it is true that South Korea performed 
the repetitive activities of military operations and maritime police authority along the NLL 
and its vicinity. 
 
3. Effective Acquiescence on North Korea’s Part from 1953 to 1973 
 
Given that the theory of historical consolidation concerns “the extension of 
sovereignty over res communis,” the “attitude of other states involved” is the most significant                                                         
315 Id. According to the ILC, “this must remain a matter of judgment when sufficient time has elapsed for the 
usage to emerge….it will anyhow be a question of evaluation whether, considering the circumstances of the 
particular case, time has given rise to a usage,” Juridical Regime, supra note 177, ¶ 104. 
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element in the formation of historic title.316 As discussed earlier, effective occupation, though 
it particularly concerns terra nullius, is a useful method in determining foreign states’ 
attitudes in each territorial dispute. International jurisprudence concerning effective 
occupation focuses on “peaceful” and “undisturbed, uninterrupted and unchallenged 
possession” along with the element of “continuous display of sovereignty.”317 In order to 
prove its effective occupation, therefore, a possessing state must display its sovereignty in a 
peaceable way.318 Since more than the “absence of violence” is required, diplomatic protest is 
sufficient to stop the process.319 In this sense, “peaceful possession” can be interpreted as 
“acquiescence” on the part of foreign states.320 Again, however, the standard is not absolute, 
but rather relative.  
As there is no universal standard about what constitutes effective occupation, states’ 
positive actions, reactions against other states’ exercise of sovereignty, and even non-action 
may be deliberated.321 On the basis of the facts and circumstances, international courts and 
arbitrators determine “whether the exercise of sovereignty has been peaceful or not, 
uninterrupted or not, or public or not.”322 Therefore, a case-by-case basis will be employed to 
determine whether a claiming state’s possession of a particular territory was peaceful and 
uninterrupted by others to the extent that it could be regarded as acquiescence. Similar to the 
case of acquisitive prescription,323 however, there is no fixed standard about how long other 
                                                        
316 BROWNLIE, supra note 115, at 156. Brownlie believes that the Fisheries Court might have considered the 
silence on the part of the U.K. government “[a]s an independent basis of legality of [Norway’s title] as against 
the British claim,” id. However, it is not itself sufficient to prove the legality of a state’s territorial claim to the 
consolidation of historic title, id. 
317 See Chamizal Case, supra note 200; Island of Palmas Case, supra note 166, at 839; Eastern Greenland Case, 
supra note 202, at 45-6. In this respect, therefore, the concept of effective occupation is also connected with the 
conditions requiring the maintenance or manifestation of sovereign authorities. 
318 Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 51. 
319 See Id. 
320 Id. 
321 Id. at 54. The Pulau Ligitan/Pulau Sipadan Case indicates that “the exercise of sovereign authority must 
pertain to the disputed territory” as a criteria assessing effective occupation in a given territorial dispute. Pulau 
Ligitan/Pulau Sipadan Case, supra note 214, at ¶ 136. 
322 Lesaffer, supra note 142, at 55.  
323 Id. at 50. 
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states must remain silent. Momentary occupation, albeit peaceful, is not sufficient to establish 
effective occupation.  
At what point and in what manner must opposition be lodged against the process of 
effective occupation over a particular territory? For instance, in the Fisheries Case, Norway 
encountered no opposition against its promulgation or constant application of the Norwegian 
Royal Decree. Relying on the facts in that case, the ICJ confirmed the consolidation of the 
Norwegian method as well as the territorial waters delimited through Norway’s constant and 
sufficiently long practice, which had begun even before the dispute arose. Any sort of 
protesting acts unequivocally expressing effective and sustained opposition could have 
stopped the consolidation of Norway’s historic title.324 The Fisheries Court clearly indicates 
that an act of opposition should be launched “during the formative period of the disputed 
title.”325 Regarding the form of opposition, a competing state should take affirmative action 
against a possessing state’s open and public exercise of sovereignty.326 A competing state 
should not assert its lack of actual knowledge when there is a possessing state’s open and 
public exercise of sovereignty over a particular territory, since the exercise “imputes 
knowledge thereof to all third states with competing claims or interests.”327 Significantly, 
however, both “the lapse of time necessary for the emergence of historic title” and “the 
amount of protest necessary to defeat general toleration” will be individually examined by 
overviewing particular circumstances.328 
In conclusion, South Korea fulfilled the requirements of effective occupation as well 
as acquiescence for the first two decades, and there was the absence of affirmative action on                                                         
324 Id. (quoting Juridical Regime, supra note 177, ¶ 115). Still, however, there is a standard that protest against 
the exercise of sovereignty must be widespread, id. ¶ 116, ¶ 119. In this regard, in the Fisheries Case, the Court 
deemed the British opposition against Norway’s delimitation as significant since it had important interests in the 
North Sea, and the result of the dispute was directly related to the restriction of fishing right in the disputed area, 
Koztowski, supra note 121, at 75. 
325 Koztowski, supra note 121, at 76.  
326 Id. 
327  Id. Hence, the ILC holds that “open and public exercise of sovereignty is required rather than actual 
knowledge by the foreign States in the area,” Juridical Regime, supra note 177, ¶ 130. 
328 Id. ¶ 131.  
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North Korea’s part. 329 In this sense, North Korea is bound by the principle of estoppel. 
Before 1973, South Korea’s undisturbed, uninterrupted and unchallenged possession of the 
NLL and the disputed waters had continued without any diplomatic protest from North Korea. 
And, international law does not suggest any universal standard mandating the amount of time 
required to demonstrate the concerned state’s silence. In the NLL conflict, North Korea’s 
acquiescence can be reasonably inferred from the facts and circumstances.330 As North Korea 
was adversely affected by the consolidation of South Korea’s historic title, it should have 
launched any form of protest during the formative period so as to combat the consolidation. 
Considering that South Korea had publicly and notoriously exercised its governmental 
authority over two decades, North Korea cannot assert its lack of actual knowledge of the 
NLL at a later time. More significantly, based on the doctrine of estoppel, North Korea’s 
failure to protest within a reasonable period of time constitutes the effective acquiescence on 
its part, regardless of the presence of explicit recognition. This is because North Korea was 
obliged to inspect and protest the creation of the NLL as a belligerent party to the KAA.331 
From 1953 to 1973, when North Korea did not have considerable naval forces, it 
substantially took advantage of the stability provided by the NLL’s role as a de facto 
maritime demarcation line in the Yellow/West Sea. In the interests of international stability, 
North Korea should be estopped from protesting at a later time because South Korea’s 
historic title was already consolidated in 1973 through North Korea’s silence.332 
 
                                                         
329 A state may acquire the sovereignty over parts of the high seas through the operation of recognition, 
acquiescence and prescription. See supra note 227. 
330 See Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear: Cambodia v. Thailand, 1963 DUKE L. J. 307, 308 (1963) 
(citing the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15). 
331 See Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear: Cambodia v. Thailand, supra note 330, at 308 (quoting 
Iain MacGibbon, Estoppel in International Law, 7 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 468, 501 (1958)).   
332 See Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear: Cambodia v. Thailand, supra note 330, 308 (quoting 
Hersch Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 1950 BRIT. YB. INT’L L. 376, 395-96 (1950)). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 It is undeniable that the NLL has served as a de facto maritime demarcation line in the 
Yellow/West Sea. However, the NLL cannot be the maritime frontier of South Korea in light 
of the international law of the sea. Aside from defining the NLL, the core of the NLL conflict 
is whether South Korea’s historic title to the NLL and the water south of the line has been 
historically consolidated as part of the armistice system. 
 Throughout the NLL conflict, both sides have disputed South Korea’s alleged historic 
title. South Korea asserts that its title was consolidated as a de facto maritime demarcation 
line and that South Korea has acquired the waters south of the NLL. South Korea further 
argues that North Korea is bound by the current situation. In contrast, North Korea refutes 
South Korea’s claim by arguing that it did not explicitly recognize or acquiesce to the NLL. 
In addition, North Korea contends that the NLL significantly infringes upon its maritime 
sovereignty that must be respected under the international law of the sea. 
There are multiple international law cases relating to territorial disputes that share a 
common ground with the NLL conflict. Above all, the Fisheries Case casts light on the inter-
Korean conflict. In this case, the theory of historical consolidation constructed the main 
reasoning of the Court and the Court found that Norway had encountered no opposition 
throughout its constant and sufficiently long application of its decree. On that basis, the ICJ 
found that the Norwegian method of delimitation and the territorial waters delimited by the 
method had been consolidated even before the dispute with the U.K. arose. Precisely, the 
Fisheries Court upheld the Norwegian straight baseline system as a valid method of territorial 
delimitation and as an adaptation to the specific geological circumstances of Norway’s 
coastline. Similarly, South Korea asserts that the NLL has been historically consolidated as a 
valid straight baseline under the armistice system. Secondly, on the basis of historical 
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consolidation, the ICJ admitted Norway’s title to the disputed territorial water delimited by 
the straight baseline system. In the NLL conflict, South Korea alleges the acquisition of 
historic title to the disputed waters south of the NLL. 
 Judging from international legal practices and jurisprudence, has South Korea’s claim 
of historic title consolidated? First of all, although the absence of domestic legislation 
prescribing the NLL is often pointed out, South Korea continually exercised rights and duties 
through other types of sovereign activities before and after North Korea’s first protest in 1973. 
Importantly, the South Korean military and the maritime police never abandoned the exercise 
of authorities, particularly, in matters of security. 
Secondly, South Korea sufficiently manifested its sovereignty around the NLL and 
the disputed waters from 1953 to 1973, and the two-decade period is a sufficient amount of 
time for the purpose of historical consolidation under the particular circumstances of the 
Yellow/West Sea. To be specific, there are several instances that can support this proposition. 
It is widely known that both sides had debated over the maritime delimitation in the course of 
the armistice negotiations. This indicates that the parties to the KAA were sensitive to the 
issue as belligerents and recognized the importance of the establishment of a maritime 
demarcation line in the Yellow/West Sea. Most significantly, North Korea acted in 
recognition of the NLL by remaining silent and by not opposing the NLL during the first two 
decades. Therefore, South Korea’s sovereignty was sufficiently maintained throughout the 
period, and it never abandoned its possession of the NLL and the vicinity. 
Finally, South Korea fulfilled the requirements of effective occupation as well as 
acquiescence for the first two decades under the effective acquiescence on North Korea’s part. 
On that basis, South Korea acquired its historic title to the NLL and the disputed waters, 
though parts of them may be appertained to the international waters. So long as South 
Korea’s historic title is based on the consolidation, North Korea’s late protest is inconsistent 
Hyun Jin Kim 
LL.M. Thesis 74 
with erga omnes and further violates the doctrine of estoppel. From 1953 to 1973, South 
Korea’s undisturbed, uninterrupted, and unchallenged possession of the NLL and the the 
disputed waters continued without any opposition, even though North Korea’s maritime 
sovereignty had been adversely affected by the presence of the NLL. North Korea should 
have launched any form of protest while the formation of South Korea’s historic title was in 
progress. Due to South Korea’s public and notorious exercise of governmental authorities 
over the two decades, North Korea cannot refer to a lack of its actual knowledge of the 
exercise. Based on the doctrine of estoppel, North Korea’s failure to protest within a 
reasonable time constitutes the effective acquiescence and the consolidation of South Korea’s 
historic title, since North Korea was obliged to inspect the NLL as a belligerent party. As a 
matter of fact, North Korea took advantage of the stability provided by the NLL’s role as a de 
facto maritime demarcation line while it was reconstructing its destroyed naval forces. South 
Korea relied on North Korea’s silence throughout the formation. For the sake of international 
stability, therefore, North Korea must be estopped from protesting against the NLL and South 
Korea’s historic title at a later time. 
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